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Abstract 
In recent years, the Norwegian housing prices and household debt to disposable income have 
reached extraordinary new heights. Su et. al (2014) points to cash-out refinancing as one of the 
key drivers behind the debt to income ratios. As a contribution to more knowledge about the 
real effects of cash-out refinancing, the present thesis studies a causal relationship between 
entry into self-employment and cash-out. The study has two main findings. First, a sizeable 
amount of the total cash-out appears to be an effect of the entry into self-employment, indicating 
that cash-out refinancing is to some degree used as funding for starting businesses. Second, 
cash-out for funding entry into self-employment is substantially higher for women, supporting 
previous research showing that women attracts less start-up capital than men. Our results 
contrasts previous findings where cash-out has first and foremost been related to financial 
difficulties, which may have potential destabilizing consequences (Mian and Sufi, 2011). Our 
study indicates that there are still some unexplained effects regarding cash-out. Hence, our 
findings call for more research on what the cash-out is used for, to further enlighten the real 
effects to the national economy. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In the last couple of decades, Norway has seen an ever-growing household debt and house 
prices reaching new heights. The debt to disposable income ratio reached 227% at the end of 
2014, and in response to these high levels and the continuous growth, there has been much 
attention to the Norwegian housing market in the media, and both politicians and researchers 
questions the sustainability of the household debt. Recently, this led the Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance to request the Financial Supervisory Authorities of Norway to provide solutions for 
dampening the surging house prices (Dagens Næringsliv, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Household debt, household income, inflation and house prices, 
 percentage increase since 1995 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
With the current Norwegian debt situation, Su et al. (2014) recognizes the need for investigation 
of home-equity based borrowing in the Norwegian market. Based on data from the Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions (Statistics Norway, 2012), they find that home-equity based 
borrowing, which they refer to as cash-out, constitutes a substantial part of the high debt-to-
income ratio. They also finds that cash-out relates to financial difficulties, which could be 
worrisome for the stability of the Norwegian economy.  
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As said by Su et al. (2014), their findings call for more research on cash-out in the Norwegian 
housing market. It is important to ask what the real effects from cash-out are, dependent on how 
households spend their newly borrowed money.  Research up to this point have not found any 
conclusive evidence on how the cashed-out money is spent. Our contribution to reduce this 
uncertainty is to investigate whether cash-out refinancing are used as funding for small 
businesses and start-ups. We try to measure this by looking at individuals in the transition from 
wage-employment to self-employment. This is an important question to ask, as the cash-out 
effect has so far mostly been studied in negative contexts in relation to financial difficulty of 
the household and macro-economic instability caused by high debt-to-income ratio. However, 
for a more complete picture of the real effects from cash-out, we analyze if cash-out is used to 
fund new businesses, which puts the effects from cash-out in a more positive perspective. As 
Villund (2005) points out, even though self-employment constitutes a small part of the labor 
force, there is much interest in self-employment in respect to entrepreneurship, job creation and 
immigrants participation in the labor market. Especially for women, there seems to be an 
untapped entrepreneurial potential which could contribute to innovation and economic growth 
(OECD, 2004). 
In our analysis, we raise an interesting question about a causal relationship between the self-
selection into self-employment and the level of cash-out refinancing. Limited availability of 
funding and restricted access to credit can set a stopper for the establishment of new start-ups 
and small businesses, hence our idea is to investigate whether cash-out is used as a way to 
conquer this problem. When comparing raw data, the estimation of the difference in the level 
of cash-out between self-employed and wage-employed individuals give rise to possible bias, 
and to overcome this problem we have chosen to use a matching method. To address this issue 
of self-selection bias caused by non-random differences between self-employed and wage-
employed individuals, we use propensity score matching (PSM). The PSM approach allows for 
construction of counterfactual outcomes, which is the level of cash-out the self-employed 
individuals would have had if they had not become self-employed. In such way, the PSM 
approach can measure causal effects. 
In our analysis, the results from matching give an indication of a positive amount of cash-out 
caused by the self-selection into self-employment, indicating that home-equity extraction is 
used as a way of funding start-ups. Even though the matching procedure indicates a positive 
effect, we question the robustness of the results and further analyze a subsample where we 
exclude lower densities of estimated propensity scores. This procedure provides higher 
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robustness, which supports our hypothesis. We have also addressed the issue of unobserved 
heterogeneity by conducting analyses of how sensitive the estimated results are to unobserved 
bias.  
With the prevalent low participation of women engaging in self-employment, we further discuss 
the possibility of different cash-out tendencies among women and men who are self-employed. 
By the same matching procedure we find that women who becomes self-employed cashes-out 
considerably more than men. This is an interesting finding in relation to how women are more 
liquidity constrained when they want to start a business (Rønsen, 2012). 
This study aims to contribute to more research on who cashes out and why. We have chosen to 
look at cash-out in relation to self-employment, by using the cash-out model developed by Su 
et al. (2014), which puts our thesis as an extension of their paper and among studies on self-
employment, e.g. Rønsen (2012) or Disney and Gathergood (2009). We try to figure out if the 
choice of becoming self-employment is significant positively related to the level of cash-out 
when compared to other similar individuals. The matching procedure, indicates that the act of 
becoming self-employed are a cause for cash-out, and constitutes a sizeable amount of the total 
cash-out within the sample. 
The structure of this thesis will be as follows: in chapter 2 we will cover relevant background 
literature of self-employment, house prices and debt, and cash-out refinancing. In chapter 3 we 
will formalize our research goals and chapter 4 will cover data material and descriptive 
statistics. Chapter 5 will cover theory of our empirical framework, and modeling of cash-out. 
Our main analysis is covered in chapter 6, with some further questions in chapter 7. Chapter 8 
will conclude our thesis with discussion of the main results from chapter 6 and 7.  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
4 
 
  
2.1. Characteristics on self-employed 
5 
 
2 Background and literature 
2.1 Characteristics on self-employed 
Self-employment has recently become a popular area of research, and there is quite a few 
studies in various contexts, among them housing wealth and liquidity constraints (Hurst and 
Lusardi, 2004, Disney and Gathergood, 2009), wages and income differences (Praag and 
Raknerud, 2014, Kaiser and Malchow-Møller, 2011), innovation and economic growth (OECD, 
2004), gender differences (Rønsen, 2012) and several descriptive statistical reports (Stambøl, 
2008, Fjærli et al., 2013), all with self-employment as the main perspective. Self-employment 
as a topic can also be related to the housing market literature, as we investigate differences in 
the amount of home-equity refinancing in the Norwegian market, see e.g. Mian and Sufi (2011) 
or Su et al. (2014). 
 
2.1.1 Research and statistical properties 
Between 1996 and 2014, the average of self-employed individuals as percentage of the total 
labor stock was about 7.3%, and quite steady the whole time, illustrated in figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Total employment, wage employed and self-employed 
and self-employed as percentage of total employment 
Source: Statistics Norway, Arbeidskraftundersøkelsen 
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Villund (2005) studies distribution and mobility of self-employed individuals in Norway, using 
data from 1997 to 2003. He finds that in general, significantly more men than women are self-
employed, the average age is higher and the level of education is substantially lower than 
regular wage-employed individuals. He also points out that the proportion of self-employed are 
higher in rural than in central areas. This relates to the high amount (more than 50%1) of self-
employed individuals that constitutes the primary sector (mostly farmers and fishermen) and 
craftsmen. The propensity to become self-employed is also higher in regions with a tighter job 
market and higher unemployment and most of the recruitment into self-employment comes 
from people outside the workforce. These demographical characteristics are also in accordance 
with Stambøl (2008), which uses data from the Labor force survey conducted by Statistics 
Norway. 
Stambøl (2010) has also studied to what extent self-employed individuals sustain their business 
over time. More than 20% shut down their business after only one year, and in a five-year 
period, only 50% survived. Self-employed men last longer than women, and those who start a 
new business for their first time, are more likely to quit sooner. Middle-aged individuals with 
medium term education are most likely to have success with their business, and are less likely 
to give up. Many of those who end their career as self-employed, either become wage-employed 
or leave the workforce. Kaiser and Malchow-Møller (2011) used data on Danish men to 
quantify effects of past self-employment on subsequent earnings. Their econometric approach, 
which is the same as ours (PSM2), on average suggest that a period of self-employment actually 
lower hourly wages in their subsequent jobs. However, their findings show that hourly wages 
may increase, if they become wage employed in the same sector as they were self-employed. 
Hence, the negative effect on wages might be due to sector changes and not necessarily self-
employment directly. 
Rønsen (2012) studies the puzzle of the low women to men ratio of the self-employed 
individuals. She points to previous studies which show that female entrepreneurs attracts less 
capital and start businesses with scarce financial resources compared to men. In accordance 
with Rønsen, OECD (2004) also finds that women’s access to capital is more restricted than 
men’s. The likelihood for newly started businesses to survive early growth phases have been 
found to be equal for both men and women in Norway, but high growth companies are primarily 
started, owned and run by men (Ljunggren, 2008). A psychological perspective of the self-
                                                 
1 According to Villund (2005). 
2 More on this in Chapter 5 
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employed are contributed by e.g. Brown et al. (2011) and Ekelund et al. (2005), who studies 
why some individuals chose to become self-employed instead of being wage employed. They 
find that individuals with less risk-averse properties have a larger probability of future self-
employment. 
Rønsen (2012) further discuss some theories for the gender difference, e.g. difference in risk 
aversion and lack of self-confidence, and points to research which shows that the proportion of 
women in Norway who thinks they have the necessary competence to become an entrepreneur 
are significantly lower than among men. She also points out what OECD (2004) is arguing, that 
increased participation for women into self-employment could make a significant contribution 
to new business formation, job creation, productivity gains and economic growth. Women who 
are starting businesses choose a significantly different sector compared to men, and this could 
be blamed by cultural beliefs about the genders. A rather surprising finding is that having 
children is no barrier to becoming self-employed for either men or women. Even more 
surprising, women with children under age of 10 seems to have a higher propensity to become 
self-employed then women without children. The propensity of becoming self-employed are 
closely linked to employment status of their spouse or cohabitant. If the partner are out of the 
labor force, the propensity to become self-employed are higher for both men and women. 
 
2.1.2 Some regulatory aspects on self-employment in Norway 
 The National Insurance Act (Folketrygdloven (1997)) §1-10 defines self-employment as a 
person who runs their own business at their own account and risk, rather than working for 
someone else. Their occupation should also be persistent and have positive net income. When 
the tax authorities decides whether to permit registration as self-employed or not, they are 
required to consider the following: 
- If the business is of a certain extent. 
- If the person has the sole responsibility for the result of the business. 
- If the person has employees in his service or is using freelancers. 
- If the person runs the business from an established office or building. 
- If the person has the financial responsibility for the business 
- If the person uses his/her own assets to fund the operation of the business. 
In Norway, it is actually not required to have any equity or starting capital to register and start 
as sole-proprietorship, but as stated above there are still several criteria for the authorities to 
Chapter 2. Background and literature 
8 
 
consider. On the other hand, when starting an incorporation, a minimum amount of capital 
(30,000 NOK) is required for equity in the new firm. Self-employed persons starting a sole 
proprietorship are liable for all debt and income and are legally bound to cover any eventual 
losses from their firm, but this does not apply when starting an incorporation. All self-employed 
individuals must be enlisted in several governmental registers and be at least 183 years of age 
to start their own incorporation. It is also worth noting that the rules and legislations for social 
benefits do not cover self-employed persons at the same level as regular employees, see Altinn 
(2015). 
 
2.2 Benefits of self-employment 
Thurik et al. (2008) discusses the relationship between self-employment and unemployment 
and argues that self-employment can have some positive effects on the level of employment in 
a society. They find that high rates of self-employment increase entrepreneurial activity and 
thereby reduce unemployment in subsequent periods, which can be a good thing for the society 
as a whole. Glocker and Steiner (2007) studied a German pseudo-panel data and found that 
previous unemployment had positive effects on entry rates into self-employment for both 
genders, hence governmental legislature supporting an easy and flexible system for the self-
employment, may also have positive effects on the level of employment.  
Praag and Raknerud (2014) reconsiders the so-called “entrepreneurial puzzle” and compare the 
transition from self-employment to entrepreneurial activity using matched person-firm data on 
Norwegian individuals and firms in the period 2002-2011. They find that the average return to 
entrepreneurship is significantly negative, unless the individual establishes a relatively large 
incorporation, then the return becomes slightly positive. This is in line with Hamilton (2000), 
who finds that individuals who switch from wage employment to entrepreneurship gets quite 
low pecuniary returns 
Self-employment can be a driver for innovation and economic growth (OECD, 2004), and most 
empirical studies measures entrepreneurship in terms of self-employment (Praag and Raknerud, 
2014). Romero and Martínez-Román (2012) summarize the key factors of innovation in small 
businesses to three identifiers: the characteristics of the self-employed individual, the 
characteristics of the organization and the characteristics of the external environment. They 
point to personal characteristics that influence innovation in small businesses, such as level of 
                                                 
3 To start a sole-proprietorship, you have to be at least 15 years old. 
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education, previous experience and personal motivation. Organization characteristics boils 
down to technological opportunities within the sector (expected profits from innovations), level 
of market concentration (number of competitors), cooperation with other firms, number of 
employees and management style.  External environment components related to success and 
innovation of the self-employed are knowledge spillovers, which allows small businesses to 
innovate without large investments in research and development (R&D), cultural values in the 
region and the characteristics of the institutional framework. In addition to the research on 
determinants of innovation for the self-employed, they also address that 40% of the self-
employed workers with small businesses in Spain reported product innovations, and 46% 
reported process innovations. 
 
2.3 Financing start-ups in Norway 
To be able to start a business, it is necessary to have some amount of capital or credit, dependent 
on how capital intensive the start-up is. Hence, liquidity constraints can ruin the prospects for 
many individuals eager to start their own business (Disney and Gathergood, 2009). Credit 
availability and the household’s finances is an important issue to undertake, when considering 
entry into self-employment or stay employed in an existing system with safe barriers. If credit 
availability is limited, it might get hard to get the business up and running. 
There are several ways to deal with the financing of the start-up. Collateral is necessary to be 
able to get a loan from a commercial bank, and one possibility is to use the house as an asset 
for this purpose. The surge in house prices in recent years make this a convenient way to get 
more credit, if your mortgage-to-income ratio and credit worthiness allows it. Accumulated 
capital or savings from previous years can also make up the equity in the start-up. In recent 
years, crowdfunding has become an increasingly popular way of financing through internet 
(Belleflamme et al., 2014). Another possibility is venture capital for start-up firms and small 
businesses with high growth potential. Installment loans for long term needs and overdraft 
facilities are also possible means for acquiring credit for the shorter term (DNB, 2015). Another 
possibility is to lease equipment or other necessities, which frees up other working capital. Our 
focus for this thesis is the acquiring of credit through home-equity refinancing. 
If a person has membership in the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme and gets laid off or 
fired, in general he/she is eligible to unemployment benefits from the Norwegian Labor and 
Welfare Administration (NAV, 2015). When becoming self-employed, they can be granted 
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these benefits for up to 9 months4 while developing and establishing your new occupation. 
There are some initiatives from the government in Norway, but they are mostly directed to 
innovation and contingent on extensive Research and Development, see The Research Council 
of Norway (2015). Innovation Norway, a governmental organization for innovation and 
development of Norwegian businesses also grants subsidies and support, but usually only for 
innovative start-ups and entrepreneurs (Innovation Norway, 2015). 
Several papers has investigated the relationship between household wealth and business entry, 
and documented a positive relationship. One paper conducting research on an American 
household survey, suggest that this positive relationship is highly non-linear and only occurring 
among the top 5th percentile of household income (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). Hurst and Lusardi 
also analyzed variation in house price appreciation in different regions and the effect of using 
home equity as capital for a start-up, but did not find any significant results for the hypothesis 
that regions with high house price appreciation were more likely to start their own business. 
Disney and Gathergood (2009) confirms these findings on a UK data set, but their findings also 
suggest that households with greater wealth are more likely to start up businesses. 
 
2.4 House prices and household Debt 
With house prices soaring and significant increase in mortgage debt levels as percentage of 
household disposable income, there is no doubt the Norwegian housing market has attracted 
much attention lately. On December 12th 2014, the Norwegian central bank cut the policy rate 
to 1.25%, after more than two years being at 1.5%. This rate cut was mainly due to a steep 
decline in oil prices in the second half of 2014 and thereby expectations of lower economic 
growth in Norway and other oil producing countries, in addition to the low interest rate 
environment in Scandinavia and the rest of EU. After this, a surge of rate cuts occurred in most 
of the Norwegian commercial banks, and there are still stiff competition in acquiring as many 
home mortgage borrowers as possible (NTB, 2015). The debt-to-income ratio for Norwegian 
households have tripled since the 2000’s, fueling up on the ongoing debate whether these high 
debt levels are sustainable (Lindquist, 2012). 
Deregulation in financial markets, falling house prices and high debt levels in the US, is seen 
as the main reason for the recent worldwide financial crisis in 2007, see Koetter and Poghosyan 
(2010), Anundsen et al. (2014) and IMF (2009). The crisis brought the relationship between the 
                                                 
4 Certain other requirements must be met, Altinn (2015) for more information on this. 
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real economy and financial markets on the agenda around the world. The US household 
leverage increased sharply preceding the crisis, where the household sector doubled its debt 
balance in only 5 years. Mian and Sufi (2011) also points out a strong link between house price 
appreciation and increased household borrowing. Anundsen and Jansen (2013) find a two-way 
interaction between house prices and household borrowing in the long run. Their research on 
Norwegian households points out that increased house prices lead to credit expansion, and then 
credit expansion puts pressure on the house prices. Interest rates also affect house prices 
indirectly through the credit channel. 
Bernanke et al. (1999) introduces an explanation to the housing market fluctuations, a 
mechanism they call the financial accelerator. First, higher house prices increase the amount 
of credit necessary to buy a house, which in turn strengthens the demand for credit. Second, in 
general housing loans are secured by the property itself.  The net-worth of the households 
increases as house prices surge, thereby increasing their borrowing capacity. Simultaneously 
the likelihood of defaults on existing loans reduces, and may give banks motivation to increase 
their lending. This effect is also prevalent in the Norwegian housing market, as suggested by 
the cointegration analysis conducted by Anundsen and Jansen (2013). 
High levels of debt-to-income has led Lindquist (2012), among others, to ask whether these 
levels are sustainable in the event of hikes in the loan rate. She evaluates the sustainable 
household debt in Norway by investigating household’s debt servicing income and their 
sensitivity to increase in loan rates. She finds that first-time buyers and second steppers groups, 
which constitutes more than half the household debt in Norway, are vulnerable to rate hikes. 
Therefore, shocks to income, interest rates or house prices may have serious effects on the 
financial and price stability, and this has led the Central Bank of Norway to monitor the 
household closer. 
In a fundamental perspective, actual debt should be consistent and not deviate too much from 
a model prediction based on fundamental explanatory variables and sound economic theory, to 
ensure the sustainability of the debt. Barnes and Young (2003) defines sustainable debt as 
“…the level of debt chosen by a household is sustainable whenever the expectations about 
income growth, house prices, interest rates and other determinants of borrowing that underlie 
the choice are not falsified or revised.” They used an overlapping generation model on US data 
to explain different household cohort’s rise in accumulation of debt and assets, and points out 
that the sustainability of the household debt, crucially depends on the realization of the 
expectations the households have made their borrowing decision on. 
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Expectations about higher wages, increasing house prices and lower interest rates may fuel up 
on the surge in debt levels. The recent years huge profits from loan financed house purchases, 
due to seemingly ever increasing house prices, may have led the household’s willingness for 
further indebtedness, without equivalent income growth to compensate for the growth in debt 
(Borgersen and Kivedal, 2012).  
 
2.5 Cash-out / home equity extraction 
Mian and Sufi (2011) studies how homeowners borrow in response to increased house prices, 
in the period 1997 to 2008 in USA. They find significant results of this home equity based 
borrowing, but the results is not uniform across households. The results suggests that 
homeowners with high credit card utilization and low initial credit scores have strong 
tendencies for borrowing against an increase in home equity, and there is weaker tendencies for 
homeowners with high credit scores. Their results even show that homeowners in the top 
quartile of the credit score distribution show no tendency for borrowing against increased home 
equity. A bit surprising finding, as they describe themselves, is that home equity-based 
borrowing is stronger for younger homeowners. They also look at reasons for equity-based 
borrowing, and find no evidence for either purchase of new (and better) homes or investment 
properties. Neither do they find evidence for down payment of expensive credit card debt. By 
this, they suggest that there is a high marginal private return to borrowed funds. 
Su et al. (2014) make use of Norwegian data to research how existing homeowners withdraw 
cash out of increased home equity by refinancing their mortgage, in response to house price 
appreciation. They, as we will, call this cash-out refinancing. They find that cash-out is present 
among all groups of households despite the duration of their ownership, income, gender, age, 
education, household size, number of employed persons in the household, their native origin 
and the number of kids in the household. Their results suggests that cash-out by existing home 
owners (in the sample) accounts for at least 36.7% of the total mortgages, which in comparison 
to mortgages of new home buyers is a substantial part of total household debt. A finding which 
is consistent with Mian and Sufi (2011) in the American sample is that cash-out is connected 
to financial difficulties. As reported, the probability of having financial difficulties for the 
quarter of households with the highest cash-out-to-income ratio is about 45% higher than that 
for the quarter of households with the lowest cash-out-to-income ratio. In their paper, they 
compare this cash-out-to-income ratio to mortgage-to-income ratio, where the latter is a widely 
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used measure of household leverage, and suggest that the cash-out-to-income ratio may be a 
more informative ratio for predicting household financial difficulties. Almaas and Bystrøm 
(2014) investigates cash-out refinancing in Norway in the period 2001-2012, although they do 
not find any sufficient evidence for an increasing cash-out over time, they do confirm the 
presence of cash-out in the Norwegian households.  
Benito (2009) studies the decision for home equity withdrawal in the UK over 1993-2003, in 
the context of a life cycle model of mortgage refinancing (Angelini and Simmons, 2005) and a 
model where the home-owner maximize present value of utility from holding liquid assets, 
consumption and mortgage borrowing (Hurst and Stafford, 2004). The key points of such 
models are that those who borrow against home equity are:  
- younger or have a rising income profile, and thus borrow to give a smooth 
consumption path.   
- those who have experienced financial shocks and use housing equity as buffer. 
- those who have higher levels of equity in their home, e.g. in response to house price 
appreciation. This is a precondition for home equity based borrowing. 
- those who live in areas with lower local house price volatility. 
- those who are liquidity constrained and have few other liquid assets to utilize. This 
especially when the household is experiencing financial shocks. 
In this framework house price appreciation will increase the propensity to withdraw equity at 
an aggregate level, because of how asset price movements affect borrowing and spending and 
is related to credit channel models. Another effect on aggregate level is how interest fluctuations 
will change the benefit of remortgaging, especially an interest rate decrease is associated with 
home equity extraction. 
The empirical findings of Benito (2009) suggests that home equity based refinancing conforms 
to their choice of economic models. The likelihood of withdrawing equity are high for 
individuals in their 20s and 30s, with a peak around the age of 40 and a decline in likelihood 
thereafter. This is what one would expect in the life-cycle frame of reference for consumption 
path smoothing. The results also show that negative financial shocks have a significantly 
positive impact on the likelihood of withdrawal, suggesting that in normal times households are 
less likely to withdraw home equity. Liquidity-constrained households in the beginning of the 
sample period also show an increased propensity to withdraw equity. Households with more 
home equity are also more likely to withdraw equity. These are all findings confirming that 
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home equity extraction followed theoretical models within the sample period in the UK. They 
also show some intuitive findings such as that change in marital status effect the propensity to 
withdraw home equity. 
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3 Research Questions 
3.1 Motivation 
The ongoing debate on the health of the Norwegian debt levels, has led both foreign and 
domestic researchers and politicians to question the sustainability of the Norwegian housing 
market, see e.g. Lindquist (2012). Su et al. (2014) suggests that the cash-out effect is much to 
blame for the recent surge in Norwegian household’s debt levels, and with this in mind we think 
it is necessary with further investigation of these effects. Since there are no sufficient evidence 
for what cash-out is used for, it is difficult to say much about the broader implications of cash-
out contributed debt levels. The present study is a contribution in this respect, and the main 
purpose of our research is to shed some light on this missing link, by trying to find a relationship 
between cash-out and spending. 
Our idea is simple. We want to find out if cash-out is used as an alternative source of funding 
for individuals who need capital to start their own small business, which we measure by 
individuals who transitions from wage employment into self-employment. Even though the 
question we ask is simple, there is no easy way of measuring such an effect because of the 
potential self-selection bias of assignment into self-employment. We must overcome the 
fundamental problem of causal inference5 which we do with propensity score matching (PSM). 
This method will enable us to simulate an experimental study, and look for structural 
differences in the level of cash-out between individuals transitioning into self-employment in 
comparison with otherwise “equal” individuals.  
An idea like this is easily justified, since starting a small business may require a larger amount 
of capital than normal households have in liquid funds. In Norway many people have their 
portfolio of investments almost exclusively in their home (Andreassen, 2014), thus after a house 
price appreciation the value of their home is a natural place to find the capital needed in a start-
up phase. Since the self-employed individuals are a small part of the total labor force6, such an 
causal effect of self-employment on cash-out would probably be a minor part of the large 
amount of the total cash-out that Su et al. (2014) finds. Thus, looking for such an effect and 
quantifying it, may yield surprising results. 
                                                 
5 See chapter 5.1 for explanation of the fundamental problem of causal inference.  
6 The proportion of self-employees in the workforce is about 7.3%. See chapter 2.1 
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3.2 An idea in a new direction 
As previously discussed, cash-out has first and foremost been associated with financial 
difficulty of certain home-owners, which could be a financial destabilizer to the national 
economy. In contrast to such effects, our idea is in a more positive direction. As discussed in 
chapter 2, there could be several different kinds of benefits to society from self-employed 
individuals, with examples such as job creation, immigrant’s participation in the labor force 
and in some cases entrepreneurial activity and innovation. It could therefore be argued that if 
the society’s benefits are larger than (or at least not insignificant to) the cost of debt caused by 
the cash-out of self-employed individuals, dependent on usage, the cash-out in itself may be a 
cause for good. That said, it is not our purpose to measure the social-economic impacts of self-
employment in comparison to debt, and we will leave this as a resource for further debate and 
research. 
 
3.3 Hypothesis 
Our hypothesis for our analysis is whether the decision to become self-employed, which we use 
to measure start-ups of small businesses, have an effect on the level of cash-out. In the same 
Norwegian sample as Su et al. (2014) have found evidence for a large cash-out caused debt-to-
income ratio, we focus on whether we can find some evidence on what this cash-out is used for. 
Formally stated our hypothesis is: 
 
Main hypothesis: The individual’s choice of becoming self-employed give rise to a 
positive and significantly larger amount of “cash-out” when compared to otherwise similar 
individuals. 
4.1. Data material 
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4 Data Material 
4.1 Data material 
Our analysis is based on data from the Norwegian EU-SILC survey (European Union Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions) from 2012. Data were collected mainly through telephone 
interviews, with some personal interviews as the exception. Additional data from the 
Norwegian Registration data set is linked to the survey thus completing the data set with 
information on income and taxes etc. The Norwegian Social Science Data Archives (NSD) 
makes the data available to researchers and students, after anonymizing the data set. The 
surveys is carried out annually with a three-year cycle, with different topics each year. The topic 
in 2012 were on housing, living conditions, and exposure and fear of crime. A representative 
sample of 11387 people with an age above 16 was pulled from the population. With a response 
rate of 55.6% leaves a net sample size of 6186. Selection criteria is based on age, gender, 
education, family size and county (Vrålstad et al., 2013). 
We follow Su et al. (2014) and restrict our available data by dropping observations of lesser 
importance for our study. We first drop all households that do not own their own house, since 
renters (1,009 observations) and households with shared ownership (728 observations) are 
irrelevant for our analysis. We further drop observations with missing predicted price (340 
observations), missing bought price (190 observations), or missing amount of current mortgage 
(168 observation). We drop households who have lived in their home for more than 25 years 
(918 observations) and finally we drop observations of households where no one are employed 
(312 observations), and are left with a sample of 2,475 observations. For a period over 25 years 
the household situation may have changed because of exogenous factors such as fast economic 
growth in Norway, also their possible cash-out may have already been paid back. Furthermore, 
observations without any employed persons are neither of interest since we only look at 
difference between those who are employed and those who are self-employed, hence the reason 
for dropping these variables. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
In table 4.1 we present relevant statistics from the households, including relevant selection 
criteria variables such as age, gender, education level and more. In table 4.3 the variables listed 
are defined (more discussion around the variables are given in chapter 6.1). We also list the 
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proportion of households with at least one self-employed individual, and the level of cash-out 
in the households. The proportion of households with at least one self-employed individual is 
10%, note that this is not the real population ratio. Since we have excluded some observations, 
the reported ratio is the sample-selection ratio7. The cash-out variable8 is winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile to reduce outlier bias9. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics for the full sample 
Variable 
 
Mean Median Min Max SD N 
Self-employed 
 
0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.30 2,475 
Cash-Out 
 
0.53 0.40 -2.34 5.64 1.12 2,190 
Age 
 
41.94 42.00 16.00 79.00 12.74 2,475 
Gender 
 
0.56 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 2,475 
Education 
 
1.17 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.82 2,475 
Couple 
 
0.82 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 2,475 
PartnerEducation 
 
0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.27 2,475 
NumEmployed 
 
1.75 2.00 0.00 7.00 0.64 2,475 
Regions        
Oslo and Akershus 
 
0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.43 2,475 
Hedmark and Oppland 
 
0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 2,475 
Østlandet otherwise 
 
0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.39 2,475 
Agder and Rogaland 
 
0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.37 2,475 
Vestlandet 
 
0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.37 2,475 
Trøndelag 
 
0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.30 2,475 
Nord-Norge 
 
0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.28 2,475 
 
Furthermore we present summary statistics in table 4.2, where we divide the statistics into those 
who are self-employed and those who have reported another type of employment. This gives a 
                                                 
7 For population ratios of Norway see e.g. Rønsen (2012)  
8 See chapter 5.9 for a description of the cash-out variable. 
9 See appendix C on winsorizing, and figure C.1 for cash-out distribution before and after matching. 
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brief overview of the main characteristics in the two sub-samples. By visual examination of the 
data before matching10 we see that the mean value of cash-out for the self-employed is 0.62 
million and for the wage employed it is 0.52 million. This indicates a mean difference between 
self-employed and wage-employed in respect to cash-out. The table also indicates the age and 
gender difference, with higher age and more men among the self-employed. There are also a 
lower mean education level of the self-employed, but there are a higher ratio of self-employed 
with a partner who have higher education.  
 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics for self-employed and wage-employed 
 
 Self-employed 
N=243 
 
Wage-employed 
N=2232 
Variable 
 
Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD 
Cash-Out 
 
0.62 0.39 1.27  0.52 0.41 1.11 
Age 
 
47.16 47.00 10.97  41.38 42.00 12.79 
Gender 
 
0.67 1.00 0.47  0.54 1.00 0.50 
Education 
 
0.79 1.00 0.86  1.21 1.00 0.81 
Couple 
 
0.88 1.00 0.32  0.81 1.00 0.39 
PartnerEducation 
 
0.23 0.00 0.42  0.06 0.00 0.24 
NumEmployed 
 
1.63 2.00 0.68  1.76 2.00 0.63 
 
Regions 
 
       
Oslo and Akershus 
 
0.27 0.00 0.44  0.24 0.00 0.42 
Hedmark and Oppland 
 
0.08 0.00 0.28  0.07 0.00 0.25 
Østlandet otherwise 
 
0.22 0.00 0.41  0.18 0.00 0.39 
Agder and Rogaland 
 
0.12 0.00 0.32  0.17 0.00 0.37 
Vestlandet 
 
0.14 0.00 0.35  0.17 0.00 0.37 
Trøndelag 
 
0.09 0.00 0.29  0.10 0.00 0.30 
Nord-Norge 
 
0.08 0.00 0.28  0.08 0.00 0.28 
Note: the number of observations of cash-out is 209 for self-employed and 1981 for 
Wage-employed. 
                                                 
10 See chapter 5 for description and theory of propensity score matching. 
Chapter 4. Data Material 
20 
 
 
Table 4.3 Definition of variables 
Variable 
 
Definition 
Self-employed  
Equals 1 for self-employed individuals and 0 for wage 
employed individuals. 
Cash-Out  Rough estimate of the level of cash-out refinancing 
Age  Age at the time of interview (2012). 
Gender  Equals 1 for men and 0 for women. 
Education  
Equals 0 for primary and lower secondary education, 1 
for upper secondary education, and 2 for higher 
education. 
Couple  
Equals 1 if individual have a life partner, i.e. married or 
cohabitant, otherwise 0. 
PartnerEducation  
Equals 1 if individuals life partner have higher 
education, otherwise 0. 
NumEmployed  The number of employed persons in the household. 
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5 Theory and empirical approach 
We will in this chapter present the theory about the empirical framework of propensity score 
matching (PSM), and relate it to our application. We will address assumptions of PSM and 
different matching algorithms used in the analysis. A discussion of data requirements are 
provided before we conclude the PSM section with theory of sensitivity testing procedures. At 
last, this chapter ends with a model for cash-out refinancing. 
 
5.1 PSM introduction 
Propensity-score matching (PSM) is a widely used approach for estimating casual treatment 
effects, with applications ranging from evaluation of labor market policies (Heckman et al., 
1999), the impact of property taxation on costs control (Borge and Rattsø, 2008) to the effect 
of water supply on child mortality (Galiani et al., 2005). The method applies to all situations 
where there is a form of treatment, a group of individuals receiving a treatment and a group not 
receiving the treatment. The vast amount of applications is due to the diverse nature of possible 
treatments (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). PSM is well described in the literature, e.g., by 
Heckman et al. (1997), Heinrich et al. (2010) Becker and Ichino (2002). The seminal references 
are Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). A recent paper that 
utilizing PSM method on self-employment is Kaiser and Malchow-Møller (2011), which 
studies the influence of self-employment on wage. 
In evaluation of treatments there are problems due to the fact that we cannot observe both a 
treated outcome and a non-treated outcome for the same individual at the same time, which is 
called the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference (Holland, 1986). In the absence of 
experimental design, taking the mean outcome of non-treated individuals as an approximation 
for the non-treated outcome, give rise to a possible biased conclusion of causality. This because 
of how there usually are non-random differences between individuals in the treated and non-
treated groups, either by obvious and visual differences or by hidden differences, where this 
may lead to selection bias (Heinrich et al., 2010). In the case of our application where we 
measure the level of cash-out of self-employed and wage-employed individuals, the treatment 
is the choice of becoming self-employed11. This choice can lead to a self-selection bias since 
the treated individuals (those who choose to become self-employed) and the untreated 
                                                 
11 Treated individuals are those who are self-employed, and untreated are those who are wage-employed. 
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individuals (those who are wage-employed) will likely differ in personal characteristics. This 
can be both visual differences like age, gender and education, but also more subtle differences 
(and possibly unobserved differences) like motivation and risk aversion (Ekelund et al., 2005). 
A possible solution to selection bias problems is a matching approach where observable pre-
treatment control variables captures relevant differences between any treated and untreated 
individuals, which can lead to an unbiased estimate of the treatment impact (Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002). The basic idea of matching is to create a control group of the non-treated 
individuals who are similar to the treated individuals with respect to the pre-treatment control-
variables (personal characteristics) gathered in a matching vector 𝑋. This method increases in 
difficulty as the size of the 𝑋 vector grows, and is known as the curse of dimensionality where 
the meaning of the word similar becomes less clear, thus the idea of “closeness” in higher 
dimensions of 𝑋 is not clearly defined (Heinrich et al., 2010).  An approach to reduce the 
dimensionality problem is the use of balancing scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), where 
one possible type of balancing scores is the propensity score. Propensity score is the probability 
of being in the treated group given the observed characteristics 𝑋, this is the matching method 
known as propensity-score matching and is our choice of matching method. 
 
5.2 Roy-Rubin model 
To formalize the problem of how to measure outcome of an individual dependent on receiving 
treatment, we introduce the Roy-Rubin-model (Roy, 1951, Rubin, 1974) as presented by 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and Heinrich et al. (2010). We denote the treatment effect for an 
individual 𝑖 by 𝜏𝑖, and define this as the difference between the potential outcome in case of 
treatment and the potential outcome in case absence of treatment: 
 𝜏𝑖 = 𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖 (5.1) 
Where 𝑌1𝑖 is the potential outcome
12 in case of treatment for individual 𝑖, and 𝑌0𝑖 is the potential 
outcome in case absence of treatment for individual 𝑖. The expected value of 𝜏 is known as the 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and gives the mean impact of a program averaged over all the 
individuals in the population: 
 𝜏𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸(𝜏) = 𝐸(𝑌1 − 𝑌0) (5.2) 
                                                 
12 Potential outcome is the level of cash-out in our analysis. 
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Another and in most cases (as in our study) a more important value is the Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated (ATT) (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008), this measures the impact of the 
program on those individuals who are in the treatment group: 
 𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌1 − 𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 1) (5.3) 
Where 𝐷 is a binary variable that denotes the state of the treatment, 𝐷 = 1 for 𝑖 in treated and 
𝐷 = 0 for 𝑖 in non-treated. 
The last value follows naturally and is the Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated (ATU), 
and measures the impact that the program would have had on those who are in the non-treatment 
group: 
 𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑈 = 𝐸(𝑌1 − 𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 0) (5.4) 
The problem with these values (ATT and ATU) are that they are impossible to measure since 
they rely on counterfactual outcomes. We cannot get a measure of a potential outcome in 
absence of treatment on an individual who receives treatment. To illustrate this we rewrite 5.3: 
 𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌1 | 𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 1) (5.5) 
Here the second term is unobserved since this is the average outcome that treated individuals 
would have obtained in the absence of treatment, which is not observed for obvious reasons. 
An experimental designed study could avoid this problem by utilizing that the potential 
outcome is independent of treatment status: 
 (𝑌1, 𝑌0) ⊥ 𝐷 (5.6) 
Where we here have the desirable property that characteristics of the individuals are equally 
distributed between treated and the non-treated groups. Then we have that on average the 
groups will be identical with the exception of the treatment status. We then get: 
 𝐸(𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌0 |𝐷 = 0) (5.7) 
Here the right-hand side is observable and can be substituted into equation 5.5. In this case 
running a linear regression on treatment status is valid approach to valuation of the treatment. 
Since this property is not present in non-experimental program design, we denote the difference 
by ∆ and rewrite the equation: 
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 ∆ =  𝐸(𝑌1 | 𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 0) (5.8) 
Adding and subtracting 𝐸(𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 1) yields: 
 ∆ =  𝐸(𝑌1 | 𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 0) + 𝐸(𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 1) (5.9) 
 ∆ =  𝐴𝑇𝑇 + 𝐸(𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 1)  − 𝐸(𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 0) (5.10) 
 ∆ =  𝐴𝑇𝑇 + 𝑆𝐵 (5.11) 
Where 𝑆𝐵 is the selection bias, which is the difference between the counterfactual for treated 
individuals and the observed outcome for the untreated individuals. The goal of evaluation of 
ATT is then to reduce selection bias to zero and such get a correct estimation of the parameter13. 
 
5.3 PSM Assumptions 
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA): Given a set of observable control variables 𝑋, 
which are not affected by treatment, potential outcome are independent of treatment 
assignment: 
 (𝑌1, 𝑌0) ⊥ 𝐷 | 𝑋 (5.12) 
This implies that conditional on 𝑋, treated individuals have the same distribution  that non-
treated would have experienced if they had participated in the program and vice versa 
(Heckman et al., 1997). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) shows that when potential outcome are 
independent of treatment conditional on the control variables 𝑋, then the potential outcome are 
also independent of treatment conditional on the balancing score, where the propensity score 
𝑃(𝐷 = 1 |𝑋) = 𝑃(𝑋), is one possible balancing score. Then the CIA assumption based on 
propensity score can be written as: 
 (𝑌1, 𝑌0) ⊥ 𝐷 | 𝑃(𝑋) (5.13) 
Common Support Condition: This requirement rules out the possibility of perfect predictability 
of 𝐷 given 𝑋: 
 0 < 𝑃(𝐷 = 1 | 𝑋) < 1 (5.14) 
                                                 
13 For more detail se e.g. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), Heckman, 
LaLonde and Smith (1999)  
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This says that treatment outcome given values of 𝑋 have a positive probability of being both in 
the treated group and non-treated group (Heckman et al., 1999). 
Given that these assumptions holds, the treatment assignment are strongly ignorable 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), and the PSM estimator for the ATT can be written as14: 
 ?̂?𝐴𝑇𝑇
𝑃𝑆𝑀 = 𝐸𝑃(𝑥) | 𝐷=1{𝐸[𝑌1| 𝐷 = 1, 𝑃(𝑋)] − 𝐸[𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 0, 𝑃(𝑋)]}  (5.15) 
The PSM estimator is the mean difference in outcomes over common support, weighted by the 
propensity score distribution of the treated individuals (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
 
5.4 Model choice 
When it comes to choosing a model for estimating the propensity score, there is little advice for 
choosing a functional form, but there is consensus for choosing a logit or a probit model, see 
e.g. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Heinrich et al. (2010), Smith (1997), Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2008). In principle, there is an opportunity for choosing any binary response model, but the 
general preferences for logit or probit model rises from the shortcomings of the linear 
probability model that allow predictions outside the [0,1] bounds of probabilities. 
We follow the recommendation of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) which seems to be the general 
case in the literature, and choose to use a logit model for estimating the propensity score. The 
logit model is in the class of binary response models which takes the form: 
 𝑃(𝐷 = 1 | 𝑋) = 𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑋) (5.16) 
Where the function 𝐹(𝑧) (0 < 𝐹(𝑧) < 1) have the desired properties which makes it ideal to 
use as a balancing score. 𝛽 equals the vector of parameters, 𝑋 is the vector of control variables 
and 𝛽0 is the constant term. In the case of a logit model, 𝐹 is the logistic function with the 
functional form: 
 
𝐹(𝑧) =
exp (𝑧)
1 + exp (𝑧)
  (5.17) 
For all real numbers 𝑧 ∈  ℝ the logistic function is between zero and one (Wooldridge, 2012). 
Since this is a non-linear model, ordinary least square is not suitable, but usage of maximum 
                                                 
14 When identifying the ATT it suffice to assume that 𝑌0 ⊥ 𝐷 | 𝑃(𝑋) and 𝑃(𝐷 = 1 | 𝑋) < 1 (Smith & Todd 
2005) 
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likelihood estimation is applicable in logit estimation. Further assumptions of logit models are 
that the observations of the outcome variable are independent of each other, and that we have 
no strong multicollinarity of the explanatory variables (Tufte, 2000). 
The odds of an outcome is measured by 
𝑃(𝐷=1 | 𝑋)
1−𝑃(𝐷=1 | 𝑋)
, and indicate the ratio of the probability of 
an outcome of one against the probability of an outcome of zero. By taking the log odds and 
inserting for 𝑃(𝐷 = 1 | 𝑋) =
exp(𝑧)
1+exp(𝑧)
= 𝑝, we get: 
 
𝑙𝑛
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
= 𝑙𝑛 (
exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑋)
1 + exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑋)
1 −
exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑋)
1 + exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑋)
 
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑋   (5.18) 
Thus, the coefficients of the logit models approximately estimates the partial effects of a change 
in a variable on the log odds.  
 
5.5 Choosing matching algorithm 
The choice of a matching algorithm in large samples is of lesser importance, because as the 
sample size increases, all PSM estimators will become closer to comparing exact matches 
(Smith, 2000). However, when sample size are small the choice of the matching algorithm(s) 
can be of great importance (Heckman et al., 1997), where there usually are a trade-off between 
bias and variance (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The performance difference between each 
particular matching algorithm depend on the data at hand (Zhao, 2003), and there is no clear 
rule for determining which algorithm that is more appropriate in each context (Heinrich et al., 
2010). We therefore give a short presentation of the most common algorithms15 and their 
respective benefits and drawback, to give a more solid foundation for our choice(s). 
Nearest Neighbor (NN) Matching: this is the most straight forward matching estimator where 
individuals from the untreated group is chosen as a matching partner for a treated individual 
that is closest in terms of propensity score. There are two main categories of NN matching, the 
first are “matching with replacement” where we allow for an untreated individual to be matched 
more than once, and “matching without replacement” where an untreated individual only can 
be matched once. The benefit of replacement is that we get an increased quality of matching 
                                                 
15 We give short mathematical formulations of matching estimators in appendix F. For further detail of the most 
common algorithms and mathematical representation of the matching estimators see Smith and Todd (2005) 
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and reduced bias, but the downside is a higher variance of the estimator due to fewer used 
observations (Smith and Todd, 2005). Replacement is of particular interest when the propensity 
score distribution is very different between the treated and untreated (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). Without replacement, we get the opposite results with the benefit of lower estimator 
variance but a downside of higher bias due to lesser quality of the matches. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the principle of NN matching without replacement. We show two lines of 
real numbers between zero and one, representing the feasible values of propensity scores for 
the treated and untreated group. The grey shaded area on the lines represent the distribution of 
propensity scores for the treated and untreated, and the region where they overlap is the region 
of common support where we exclude perfect predictability cases. In this example, there are 
five hypothetical propensity scores for the treated and untreated within the region of common 
support, represented by the black dots on the lines. The black lines between the dots give the 
NN matching, and we see that we get some good matches with fairly similar values of 
propensity score for the treated and untreated. However, on the far right on the line we also get 
a bad match where the matched untreated propensity score are far away from the treated 
propensity score. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Illustration of NN matching with one neighbor without replacement, in the region of 
common support 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the principle of NN matching with replacement. After the untreated propensity 
score on the far left have been matched, it is put back in the pool of available propensity scores 
to match on. Hence, this propensity score get two matches by two different treated propensity 
scores, and we thus get matches that are closer with respect to the propensity scores and thus a 
lower bias. However, we also utilize fewer observations, resulting in a higher variance. 
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of NN matching with one neighbor and replacement, in the region of 
common support 
 
The use of oversampling, where more than one nearest neighbor is matched to each treated 
individual, will reduce variance resulting from using more information to construct the 
counterfactual for each treated individual, but this will also increase the bias that result from 
poorer matches on average (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). With oversampling there is a 
decision to make on how many matches per treated individual we should use and how we should 
weight them. 
Caliper and Radius Matching: to reduce the risk of bad matches that can occur in NN matching 
when the nearest neighbor is far away, there can be imposed a tolerance level for the maximum 
propensity score distance (caliper).  This have benefits of the same kind as replacements in NN 
matching since bad matches are avoided, thus a caliper rises the matching quality (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig, 2008). A drawback of caliper matching is that it is difficult to know a priori what 
tolerance level should be chosen (Smith and Todd, 2005). Dehejia and Wahba (2002) employ 
a variant of caliper matching known as “radius matching.” This variant utilizes the mean 
outcome of all the comparison group members within the caliper, rather than just the nearest 
neighbor. This method have the same benefits of oversampling in NN matching, but avoids the 
risk of bad matches, because of how radius matching utilizes all available comparisons inside 
the caliper, thus making many matches in good cases and fewer matches in bad cases. 
We return to our pictorial representation in figure 5.3, where a caliper is restricting the allowed 
distance between matched propensity scores. The caliper on the far right on the untreated line 
excludes a bad match (excluded match in dashed line), thus gives less bias but also reduces the 
number of used observations and gives higher variance.  
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of caliper matching, within the region of common support 
 
Kernel and Local Linear Matching: these matching types differ from those above in that they 
are non-parametric matching estimators that use weighted averages of all individuals in the 
control group to construct the counterfactual outcome (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). This has 
in comparison to the previous methods a major advantage of lower estimator variance due to 
how these methods use more information. But, a drawback is the possibility of using bad 
matches. Kernel matching can be seen as weighted regression of the counterfactual outcome on 
an intercept with weights given by the kernel weights (Smith and Todd, 2005). The weights are 
determined by the distance between each individual in the control group and the treated 
individual which the counterfactual is estimated. The estimated intercept provides an estimate 
of the counterfactual mean. Local linear matching differs from kernel matching in that local 
linear matching include a linear term in propensity score of treated individuals in addition to 
the intercept. This advantage of local linear matching is apparent when observations are 
distributed asymmetrically around the treated observations, or there are gaps in the propensity 
score. In implementations of these methods one must choose a kernel function and a bandwidth 
parameter. The choice of kernel function is of lesser importance in practice (DiNardo and 
Tobias, 2001), but the choice of bandwidth parameter is of greater importance, where there is 
a tradeoff between high bandwidth with smoother estimated density function, better fit and 
lower variance between the estimated and the true density function, but higher bandwidth may 
also smooth away underlying features thus increasing bias (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
Simply put, the choice of bandwidth is a choice between low variance and an unbiased estimate 
of the true density function16.  
With this short explanation of the algorithms, it becomes clear that we will benefit from 
reporting the estimates of several matching algorithms with several different algorithmic 
                                                 
16 A more thorough presentation of kernel and local linear matching can be found in e.g. Smith and Todd (2005) 
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parameter values. Since asymptotically, different algorithms have the same PSM estimators, 
we will get a picture of the robustness of our results. If different algorithms provides large leaps 
between the estimator values, it may indicate that further investigation is necessary to reveal 
the source of disparity. 
 
5.6 Standard Error estimation 
To test for statistical significance of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), we have 
to estimate the standard errors. We use the Stata module PSMATCH2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 
2014) which estimates approximate standard error by default on the treatment effects assuming 
independent observations, fixed weights, homoscedasticity of the outcome variable within the 
treated and within the control groups and that the variance of the outcome does not depend on 
the propensity score. See appendix F eq. F.2 for the variance to the ATT estimator. 
Another common way of estimating the standard errors is with a bootstrapping approach. Even 
though bootstrapping is a widely applied method there is little formal evidence to justify the 
application of bootstrapping (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Bootstrapping is a random process 
with resampling of observations, with replacement.  Bootstrapping works by re-estimating all 
the steps for creating the ATT estimator 𝑁 times. This gives 𝑁 bootstrapped samples and thus 
𝑁 estimated average treatment effects on treated (ATT). The distribution of these means 
approximate the sampling distribution of the population mean. We will report both the standard 
errors as reported by PSMATCH2, and bootstrapped standard errors running 200 simulations 
per estimation. 
 
5.7 Data and variables: Requirements and drawbacks for PSM 
In our analysis we need data that are sufficient for modeling the cash-out refinancing and PSM 
estimation of ATT for self-employed on cash-out. The data set used (as described earlier) are 
already proven to be sufficient for modeling of the cash-out effect in Norway, see Su et al. 
(2014), which makes the choice of this data set ideal in that sense. When it comes to data 
requirement for propensity score matching, some criteria are not that easy to fulfill. 
Implementing matching requires choosing control variables 𝑋, such that we satisfy the CIA 
assumption. Omitting important variables can give a significant increase in the bias of the 
estimates (Heckman et al., 1997). The choice of control variables should only consider variables 
5.7. Data and variables: Requirements and drawbacks for PSM 
31 
 
that influence participation in treatment, e.g. admission criteria variables, which is key variables 
that must be fulfilled to participate in the treatment (Heinrich et al., 2010). Other important 
points to remember is the fact that the variables must either be fixed over time or measured 
before participation in the treatment, and should stem from the same source (Heckman et al., 
1999). Economic theory should back up the chosen variables, but there are also several formal 
statistical measures to determine a good model specification. The variables that determine the 
assignment of individuals to self-employed status (variables that influence individual’s choice 
of becoming self-employed) are not all observable (either the known or unknown 
characteristics), hence we cannot rule out the existence of biased estimators. Known 
characteristics are more easily implemented since there are many statistical properties for the 
self-employed in Norway, as discussed in chapter 2.1.1. The unknown characteristics are more 
complicated, this can be individual qualities such as ability, risk aversion, motivation and 
intelligence. 
Because of the uncertainty of proper model specification, there is a temptation of including all 
variables that seems reasonable. Hence the question of what is worse, an underspecified model 
or an overspecified model? Bryson et al. (2002) gives two reasons to be careful with 
overspecifications. First, including unrelated variables in the model may in fact increase the 
common support problem. Second, including unrelated variables in the model will not bias the 
estimators or make them inconsistent, but it may increase variance. These two effects are in fact 
so strong that matching on a reasonably underspecified model outperforms an over specified 
model in the estimation of average treatment effects in smaller samples. A convenience with 
PSM is that poorly estimated propensity scores due to heteroskedastic error terms have little 
influence on the estimated ATT (Zhao, 2008). 
The data source is important when implementing PSM, and the data should either be gathered 
from the same source or be similarly constructed. In our case a difficult decision is made for 
us, in the sense that there are not any optimal data source to be found. As described in the last 
sections, data should either be measured before treatment or be constant over time, which means 
that the data should be measured when the self-employed individuals decided to become self-
employed. In that sense panel data would be beneficial, as panel data with one period before 
selection into self-employment and one period after selection into self-employment would 
allow us to relax the CIA assumption and assume that unobserved variables are time-invariant, 
and thus the effect of these variables can be cancelled out by taking the difference in outcome 
before and after selection into self-employment. This is the difference-in-difference approach, 
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and is similar to cross-sectional versions, except that outcome is measured in changes (Heinrich 
et al., 2010). 
There are two problems here, first there is not any panel data (to our knowledge) which 
sufficiently allows us to both do PSM estimation on the self-employed, and model cash-out at 
the same time. The second problem is that the data which are good enough for cash-out 
modeling cannot be connected to make panel data because of how the data are anonymized by 
NSD. We cannot overstate this difficulty enough, since we cannot rule out the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
5.8 Dealing with unobserved heterogeneity, sensitivity analysis 
We test for sensitivity of the ATT by checking what happens if we deviate from the CIA 
condition, and if the inference about treatment effect may be altered by unobserved factors 
(Becker and Caliendo, 2007). To give an illustration of how we accomplish this we make a 
simplifying assumption that the participation probability 𝑃(𝐷𝑖 = 1 | 𝑋𝑖, 𝑈𝑖) =  𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑈𝑖) 
= 𝑃𝑖, whereas before, 𝑋𝑖 are the observed characteristics of individual 𝑖, and 𝑈𝑖 are the 
unobserved characteristics of individual 𝑖. 𝛽 is the effect of the observed 𝑋𝑖, and 𝛾 are the 
unobserved effect of 𝑈𝑖. In experimental program design or in a perfect world without bias, 𝛾 
will equal zero and the participation probability will be influenced only by the observed control 
variables. Unfortunately, the world is not perfect and there are bias everywhere, this makes the 
odds of participation for two individuals with the same value of the control variables possibly 
different. 
We further assume two individuals 𝑖 and 𝑗 who have been matched, with 𝐹 as the logistic 
function. The odds for the individuals to receive treatment is then 
𝑃𝑖
1−𝑃𝑖
 and 
𝑃𝑗
1−𝑃𝑗
 respectively, 
and then the odds ratio is given by: 
 𝑃𝑖
1 − 𝑃𝑖
𝑃𝑗
1 − 𝑃𝑗
=
𝑃𝑖(1 − 𝑃𝑗)
𝑃𝑗(1 − 𝑃𝑖)
=
exp(𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑈𝑖)
exp(𝛽𝑋𝑗 + 𝛾𝑈𝑗)
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 ≤ 𝑈𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 1 (5.19) 
We assume that both these individuals have the same value of its observed control variables - 
as implied by a matching procedure, these terms cancel out and we are left with: 
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 exp(𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑈𝑖)
exp(𝛽𝑋𝑗 + 𝛾𝑈𝑗)
= exp{𝛾(𝑈𝑖 − 𝑈𝑗)} (5.20) 
As an example the unobserved variable 𝑈 ∈ [0, 1] could be the degree of risk aversion for an 
individual, which is especially relevant in the case of self-employment17 in our analysis. 
Rosenbaum (2002) shows that the odds ratio of the two individuals receiving treatment is 
bounded by: 
 1
Γ
≤  
𝑃𝑖(1 − 𝑃𝑗)
𝑃𝑗(1 − 𝑃𝑖)
≤ Γ (5.21) 
Where Γ = 𝑒𝛾. Both of the matched individuals have the same probability of participating only 
when the odds ratio, and thus Γ, equals one. If Γ is any larger, then individuals appearing similar 
with respect to the observed control variables could differ in their odds of participating in the 
treatment group (becoming self-employed in our application). In fact Γ determines the size of 
the hidden bias. 
To test for such effects in our estimates of ATT, we follow DiPrete and Gangl (2004) who use 
a Wilcoxon’s signed rank test statistic18 that give upper and lower bound estimates of 
significance levels at given levels of hidden bias (Γ). This test allows for continuous ATT 
outcome, which is necessary for estimating cash-out, as opposed to binary outcomes where the 
Mantel-Haenszel test are more applicable (see e.g. Aakvik (2001)). The test statistic have the 
form: 
 
𝑇 = 𝑡(𝑍, 𝑟) = ∑ 𝑑𝑠 ∑ 𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑍𝑠𝑖
2
𝑖=1
𝑆
𝑠=1
 (5.22) 
In this statistic 𝑐𝑠𝑖 is binary and both 𝑐𝑠𝑖(𝑐𝑠𝑖 ∈ {0, 1}) and 𝑑𝑠(𝑑𝑠 ≥ 0) are functions of 𝑟𝑠𝑖. The 
𝑍𝑠𝑖 variable registers which of each of the 𝑠 pairs is treated and equals one if a case is treated 
and zero otherwise, 𝑟𝑠𝑖 measures the outcome for each case in the 𝑆 pairs. 𝑐𝑠𝑖 is defined as 
follows: 
                                                 
17 See chapter 2.1.1 for discussion of self-employment characteristics. 
18 See Rosenbaum (2002) for exhaustive derivation of this procedure. 
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 𝑐𝑠1 = 1, 𝑐𝑠2 = 0    𝑖𝑓    𝑟𝑠1 > 𝑟𝑠2 
𝑐𝑠1 = 0, 𝑐𝑠2 = 1    𝑖𝑓    𝑟𝑠1 < 𝑟𝑠2 
𝑐𝑠1 = 0, 𝑐𝑠2 = 0    𝑖𝑓    𝑟𝑠1 = 𝑟𝑠2 
(5.23) 
Lastly, 𝑑𝑠 is the rank of the absolute difference between 𝑟𝑠1 and 𝑟𝑠2, with average ranks used 
for ties. When outcome of treated are greater than the outcome of the untreated, the product of 
𝑐𝑠𝑖 and 𝑍𝑠𝑖 cause pairs to be selected. We compare the sum of the ranks of these cases to the 
distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect. Under the 
assumption that there is an unobserved effect (𝑈𝑠𝑖 > 0), the test statistic becomes the sum of 𝑆 
independent random variables, where the 𝑠𝑡ℎ variable equals 𝑑𝑠 with probability: 
 
𝜋𝑠 =
𝑐𝑠1 exp(𝛾𝑈𝑠1) + 𝑐𝑠2 exp(𝛾𝑈𝑠2)
exp(𝛾𝑈𝑠1) + exp(𝛾𝑈𝑠2)
 (5.24) 
And equals 0 with probability 1 − 𝜋𝑠. Though the distribution of 𝑡(𝑍, 𝑟) under the null 
hypothesis are unknown, the distribution are bounded by two known distributions (Rosenbaum, 
2002). For any specific Γ the null distribution is upper bounded by 𝑇+ (where 𝑇+ is the 
distribution when 𝑈𝑠𝑖 = 𝑐𝑠𝑖) and lower bounded by 𝑇
− (where 𝑇− is the distribution when 𝑈𝑠𝑖 =
1 − 𝑐𝑠𝑖), which have moments calculated as
19: 
 
𝐸(𝑇+(−)) = ∑ 𝑑𝑠𝜋𝑠
+(−)
𝑆
𝑠=1
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑇+(−)) =  ∑ 𝑑𝑠
2𝜋𝑠
+(−)
𝑆
𝑠=1
(1 − 𝜋𝑠
+(−)) 
(5.25) 
Where 𝜋𝑠
+ and 𝜋𝑠
− are the upper and lower bound on 𝜋𝑠 given values of 𝑈𝑠𝑖 under 𝑇
+ and 𝑇−, 
and are defined as: 
 
𝜋𝑠
+ = {
0     𝑖𝑓    𝑐𝑠1 = 𝑐𝑠2 = 0
Γ
1 + Γ
     𝑖𝑓    𝑐𝑠1 ≠ 𝑐𝑠2
 , 𝜋𝑠
− = {
0     𝑖𝑓    𝑐𝑠1 = 𝑐𝑠2 = 0
1
1 + Γ
     𝑖𝑓    𝑐𝑠1 ≠ 𝑐𝑠2
 (5.26) 
                                                 
19 Superscript + and – indicates the upper and lower bounds respectively. 
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Using the constrained values of 𝑈𝑠𝑖 in (5.19), it follows that 𝜋𝑠
− ≤ 𝜋𝑠 ≤ 𝜋
+ for each 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆. 
With increasing number of pairs (𝑆), the distributions of 𝑇+ and 𝑇− are approximated with 
normal distributions. For any specific Γ the bound of the significance level is computed by: 
 
𝑧+(−) =
𝑇 − 𝐸(𝑇+(−))
√𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑇+(−))
~𝑁(0,1) (5.27) 
Where 𝑇 is the Wilcoxon is signed rank statistic. Increasing Γ decreases the significance, and 
we thus find the bound where we no longer can conclude that the estimated ATT is not caused 
by unobserved effects. 
 
5.9 Cash-out modeling 
Since we use the same data set as Su et al. (2014), we piggyback on their intuitive model for 
rough estimation of cash-out, and give a brief presentation here20. Their simple definition of 
cash-out is as follows: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑂𝑢𝑡 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 − (𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒) (5.28) 
This is intuitive since cash-out is the difference between mortgages an individual have at the 
time of measurement, minus the original mortgage on the individual’s house adjusted for the 
down payments made since purchase of the home. The data set does not have all these variables 
available. The only observed variable is the current mortgage, and this makes it necessary to 
estimate the cash-out. In their model, they assume that the cash-out is a proportion 𝛾1 (𝛾1 ≤ 1) 
of the house price increase and that the original mortgage is a proportion 𝛾2 (𝛾2 ≤ 1) of the 
bought price. The paid mortgage equals annual payment (assuming 25-year maturity) 
multiplied by ownership duration. With these assumptions, we can estimate: 
 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛾1 × (𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) + 
𝛾2 × 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 (1 −
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
25
)  
(5.29) 
Here the first term on the right hand side captures the cash-out, so rewriting this gives: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑂𝑢𝑡 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 𝛾2 × 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 (1 −
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
25
) (5.30) 
                                                 
20 For further detail of the model as applied to the data set see Su et. al (2014). 
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The 𝛾2 parameter varies across mortgages, and we approximate it to be 𝛾2 = 0.85. The Home 
Mortgage Loan Survey conducted by the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (2012) 
reports that 83% of the mortgages had a Loan-to-Value ratio under 85% in 2012 and the average 
mortgage maturity was 23.1 years. Hence we think that 85% is an appropriate approximation 
of 𝛾2 together with a 25 year maturity of home mortgages.  
We construct the 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 variable by taking 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 which is the sum of all 
household debt, and scale the number to millions21. 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is simply 2012 (the year 
of the survey) minus the reported year of purchase. 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 is the reported house price. 
Both 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 and 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 suffer from extreme values, so we have decided 
to winsorize22 them at the 1st and 99th percentile to reduce outlier bias. 
Table 5.1 list summary statistics of those variables we need to construct the cash-out variable. 
Where 𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 is a dummy indicating if the household have any mortgage, we see 
that 88% of the households have mortgage. In Table 5.2 we have divided the statistics giving 
the mean difference of those with and without mortgage on the variables of interest for cash-
out modeling. 
 
Table 5.1 Summary statistics of variables needed to create Cash-Out 
Variable Mean Median Min Max SD N 
HaveMortgage 0.88 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.36 2,475 
BoughtPrice 1.93 1.50 0.00 33.00 1.71 2,475 
OwnerDuration 10.10 9.00 0.00 25.00 7.09 2,475 
 
Table 5.2  Summary statistics for Mortgage vs. Non-Mortgage 
                                                 
21 Which we will do throughout the text. 
22 See appendix C for a description of winsorizing. 
 
Mortgage 
N=2190 
 
Non-Mortgage 
N=285 
Variable Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD 
CurrentMortgage 1.84 1.50 2.60  0.00 0.00 0.00 
BoughtPrice 1.96 1.50 1.72  1.68 1.20 1.63 
OwnerDuration 9.68 8.00 6.91  13.34 14.00 7.61 
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6 Empirical Analysis 
6.1 Choice of control variables 
The control variables we have chosen for the logit model are based on the characteristics of the 
self-employed, as described in chapter 2.1.1. It is also necessary to keep in mind the criteria of 
the propensity score matching procedure, see chapter 5.7. To sum up, we should only include 
variables that influence participation decision, i.e. self-employment. The choice of variables 
should also be backed up by economic theory and/or previous findings. 
It is important to match on the gender of the self-employed since this is shown in earlier research 
to be of great importance for the propensity to become self-employed. With regard to PSM 
criteria the gender variable is of no worry when it comes to measurement before treatment, 
since it is a very rare phenomenon that individuals change sex. We thus include a dummy 
variable for the gender of the individual (Gender), male as one and female as zero. The age of 
the self-employed have been shown to be significantly differently distributed than the age of 
the population of wage employed individuals, this makes age an important matching criteria. 
One difficulty with the age variable (Age) is that we do not know the age of the self-employed 
when they decided to become self-employed. We only know the age at the measurement date 
of 2012, and we do not know the length of their employment status. We therefore have to make 
some assumptions and simplifications for the age variable. We divide age into cohorts of five 
years, from 20-24, 25-29 and so on, as this decreases the precision of the age variable and thus 
gives some slack in the matching criteria. The reason for choosing five year intervals for the 
age variable is consistent with Stambøl (2010) which shows that over 50 percent of the newly 
started businesses do not survive the first 5 years. We thus make the assumption that the 
likelihood of individuals to have been self-employed for more than 5 years are small enough to 
use this as a matching variable. We also include a squared term for the age of the individuals 
(AgeSquared) to capture the change in marginal effects of age. 
Further we have chosen the education level (Education) as a matching criteria, which is 
consistent with the statistics on the self-employed, and gives some insight into the individual’s 
life choice. To meet the PSM requirement of matching of control variables we make the 
assumption that individuals either are done with education prior to becoming self-employed, or 
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do not undertake any further education while they are self-employed. We believe this 
assumption is not too far away from reality, and thereby not be a cause for bias.  
On the household level, there are several characteristics to match on. If the self-employed have 
a life partner is important, but again we have to assume that the relationship status have not 
changed since the individual made the transition into self-employment. This could be a strong 
assumption, but in regard to how the self-employed on average are older than wage-employed 
individuals, we make the assumption that the choice of life partner may be more stable for the 
self-employed than for the rest of the population, or at least have not changed too much since 
the transition into self-employment. We thus include a dummy variable for people with a life 
partner (Couple) which includes those who are married and those who are cohabitants. We also 
include a dummy variable that tells whether or not the life partner have higher education 
(PartnerEducation), as this may reflect the social capital, norms and values of the household 
(Rønsen, 2012). As we saw in chapter 2.1.1 the employment status of other members in the 
household have an impact on the individuals propensity of becoming self-employed, thus we 
include a variable for the number of employed people in the household (NumEmployed). 
We have tested for several effects that did not prove any significance for the individual’s choice 
of becoming self-employed. First we tested for region specific effects, but consistent with 
Rønsen (2012) these effects are not significant. We further tried to look at the individual’s 
native background, and whether they are immigrants or not (both first- and second-generation 
immigrants was checked). Neither of those variables are significant which is also consistent 
with the findings of Rønsen (2012). As a bi-effect of our data selection criteria23 we are not able 
to find significant effects of study program on self-employment, which should be present 
especially within education in the fields of primary industries. 
For model specification we use first and foremost a basic textbook econometric approach, as 
suggested by Heinrich et al. (2010). We start with a bare bones model with only the most 
important control variables, adding one control variable at the time, keeping only those who are 
significant and increase the predictive power measured by the pseudo R squared24. Table 6.1 
reports the results of the models we have chosen based on this approach. The estimators in the 
full model are all significant, at least at five percent level, and the estimated coefficient signs 
conforms to the statistical findings of Rønsen (2012). Partners education is significant in our 
                                                 
23 See chapter 4.1 for description of dropped observations. 
24 Pseudo R squared measure reported by Stata is McFadden's R2. 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 R2 =  1 −
ℒ𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙
ℒ𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡
, where ℒ is the 
log likelihood value. 
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sample, but in the complete sample it may be insignificant as Rønsen (2012) shows. Because 
of the previously discussed systematic gender difference between the self-employed, we have 
also listed the results from logit regression on females and males respectively. This shows how 
the different variables have different estimated implications on the log odds for the different 
genders. Note that the Couple variable and AgeSquared is not significant for men and women, 
respectively. We test for multicollinarity problem in the full sample model with a VIF approach, 
results in appendix E. Based on this approach we find no issue with multicollinarity in our 
model. 
 
Table 6.1 Logit model for propensity score estimation 
Control Variables 
 
Full sample 
 
Female 
 
Male 
Gender 
 0.4115** 
(0.1635) 
    
Age 
 0.5912*** 
(0.1714) 
 
0.5424* 
(0.3097) 
 
0.6757*** 
(0.2122) 
AgeSquared 
 -0.0412*** 
(0.0145) 
 
-0.0397 
(0.0271) 
 
-0.0472*** 
(0.0178) 
Education 
 -0.7510*** 
(0.2628) 
 
-0.6908*** 
(0.1526) 
 
-0.7815*** 
(0.1280) 
Couple 
 0.5911** 
(0.2593) 
 
0.8428** 
(0.4151) 
 
0.4405 
(0.3328) 
PartnerEducation 
 2.1686*** 
(0.2367) 
 
1.7603*** 
(0.3540) 
 
2.5083*** 
(0.3318) 
NumEmployed 
 -0.4786*** 
(0.1399) 
 
-0.7795*** 
(0.2342) 
 
-0.3173* 
(0.1820) 
Constant term 
 -3.3362*** 
(0.5342) 
 
-2.8228*** 
(0.8827) 
 
-3.3426*** 
(0.6590) 
N  2030  910  1120 
Pseudo R-squared  0.1446  0.1353  0.1504 
Standard errors in parenthesis, ***  = p <0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p<0.1. 
The table displays a binary logit estimation for selection into self-
employment, for the full sample and the two genders separately. 
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6.2 Matching quality 
There are several different steps for addressing the validity and performance of our matching 
procedure. We will perform several different balancing tests to ensure that the treatment is 
independent of unit characteristics after conditioning on observed characteristics. This means 
that after matching there should be no additional control variable that could be added to the 
propensity score model that would improve the estimation, and after matching there should be 
no significant differences between the control variables (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). If we 
after conditioning on the propensity score finds that there are still some dependence on some 
control variables, we have to re-specify our model (i.e. move back to square one). 
The balancing tests we use are some more formal than others, and least formal is the inspection 
of the pseudo R-squared. We should see dramatic decrease in the pseudo R-squared after 
conditioning on the control variables. Since the control variables should indicate no significant 
difference between the groups after matching, we test for difference in mean of each control 
variable. We do t-tests on difference in mean before and after matching, and after matching we 
expect to not reject the null hypothesis of the t-test, which means that we cannot see any 
significant bias after matching. We will further include a visual representation of standardized 
bias both before and after matching, as well as we include mean and median bias before and 
after matching. 
The standardized bias is a suitable indicator for assessing the difference in the marginal 
distributions of the 𝑋𝑖 control variables (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). The standardized bias 
is defined as the difference of sample means for each control variable in treated and untreated 
group as a percentage of the square root of the average of sample variance in both groups, before 
and after matching (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The standardized bias before matching is 
given by: 
 
𝑆𝐵𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
100(?̅?1𝑖 − ?̅?0𝑖)
√0.5(𝑉1(𝑋𝑖) + 𝑉0(𝑋𝑖))
 
(6.1) 
And the standardized bias after matching is given by: 
 
𝑆𝐵𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =
100(?̅?1𝑀𝑖 − ?̅?0𝑀𝑖)
√0.5(𝑉1𝑀(𝑋𝑖) + 𝑉0𝑀(𝑋𝑖))
 
(6.2) 
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Where 𝑋𝑖 is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ control variable and 𝑉(𝑋𝑖) is the variance. Subscript 1 is for treated, 0 is for 
untreated and M is for the matched sample. An absolute value of standardized bias above 20% 
should be considered high (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). 
Table 6.2 shows the bias reduction from a NN matching procedure with one neighbor and no-
replacement. In the unmatched sample, the difference in mean of treated and untreated is 
significant for all control variables, which means that before matching there is substantial bias 
between the treated and untreated. However, in the matched sample all differences in means 
are statistically not significant and the reduced standardized bias are higher than 60 percent for 
all variables. After matching, the absolute value of the standardized bias is below 20% for all 
control variables. 
Table 6.3 shows pseudo R-squared, mean bias and median bias before and after matching. 
Before matching the pseudo R-squared are 0.1446 and significant at a 1 percent level. In a re-
estimation of the propensity scores on the matched sample, the pseudo R-squared is equal to 
0.008 and no longer significant, indicating that the variables do not have any explanation power 
after matching. For the model as a whole in the matched sample, the mean bias is reduced from 
33.6 to 7.7. The table also includes Rubin’s R and B which shows ratio of treated variance over 
untreated variance of propensity score, and the number of standard deviations between the 
means of the groups respectively (Rubin, 2001). The R ratio should be between 0.5 and 2 and 
the B should be below 25%, and both of these condition are met for the matched sample.  
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Table 6.2 Bias reduction in the control variables 
  
 U
n
m
at
ch
ed
 
 M
at
ch
ed
 
Mean   
 %
R
ed
u
ce
d
 
 B
ia
s 
t-test 
Variable  Treated Untreated  %Bias t P > |t| 
Age  U 5.7703 5.1697  28.4  3.88 0.000 
  M 5.7644 5.9615  -9.3 67.2 -0.95 0.344 
          
AgeSquared  U 37.722 31.233  26.6  3.77 0.000 
  M 37.668 40.048  -9.7 63.3 -0.96 0.340 
          
Gender  U 0.6363 0.5420  19.2  2.60 0.009 
  M 0.6394 0.6298  2.0 89.8 0.20 0.839 
          
Education  U 0.7799 1.3185  -67.1  -9.66 0.000 
  M 0.7836 0.8846  -12.6 81.3 -1.23 0.271 
          
Couple  U 0.8899 0.8286  17.7  2.26 0.024 
  M 0.8894 0.9086  -5.5 68.6 -0.65 0.516 
          
PartnerEducation  U 0.2248 0.0335  59.4  12.08 0.000 
  M 0.2211 0.1778  13.4 77.4 1.10 0.271 
          
NumEmployed  U 1.6746 1.7814  -16.8  -2.37 0.018 
  M 1.6827 1.6731  1.5 91.0 0.15 0.878 
The table presents mean values of treated and untreated before and after matching for each 
control variable. %Bias is the standardized bias, and %Reduced Bias is the reduction in 
standardized bias after matching. t values are reported from test for difference in means of 
treated and untreated. 
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Table 6.3 Difference between unmatched and matched 
Sample  
Pseudo R 
Squared 
Likelihood 
Ratio chi2 
P > chi2 
Mean 
Bias 
Median 
Bias 
Rubin’s 
B 
Rubin’s 
R 
Unmatched  0.1446 191.10 0.000 33.6 26.6 96.5 2.29 
Matched  0.0080 4.43 0.729 7.7 9.3 20.6* 1.45* 
The table presents the difference of Pseudo R squared, mean bias, median bias and Rubin’s R 
and B for unmatched and matched sample.  
* if B < 25%, R in [0.5, 2] 
 
Figure 6.1 gives a visual illustration of the standardized bias before and after matching, for NN 
matching without replacement. We see how the standardized bias is further away from zero 
before matching, than after. This shows visually how effective the matching is, and we can 
conclude that the propensity score acts as a balancing score. The balancing properties are 
fulfilled across all of our matching algorithms, and show similar balancing results as in the NN 
matching provided in this section. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Pictorial illustration of difference in Standardized bias, before and after matching 
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6.3 Common Support 
The average treatment effect is only valid over the region of common support. To check that 
the common support condition holds we first and foremost check the distributions of treated 
and non-treated groups before and after matching. This is the most straight forward way of 
checking for common support, and as Lechner (2008) reasons, it is so easy to spot a common 
support problem that complicated formal test-statistics are of lesser importance. We have also 
ensured that the common support condition is met by setting a min/max criteria, as this excludes 
observations that lies outside the region of common support.  
Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of the treated and the untreated before and after matching. In 
the top panel (before matching), we see a clear deviation between the distributions, which in 
the lower panel (after matching) is much more similar. There is also an overlap between the 
distributions i.e. there are no clear difference in the minima and/or maxima of the distributions.  
By visual inspection, we can see that the overlap condition is met, for NN matching without 
replacement.  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Propensity score distribution of Self-employed and Wage-employed, before and after 
matching 
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Another aspect we can read out of the distribution (before treatment), is that the density of the 
propensity scores (for treated and untreated) have large thin tails. We will address this further 
in the next section. 
 
6.4 Average Treatment effect on Treated 
In table 6.4 we present estimated average treatment effect on treated (ATT) for NN matching 
and caliper matching, and table 6.5 gives radius matching, kernel and local linear matching. 
The estimated ATT’s are interpreted as the level of cash-out (in millions) caused by the self-
selection into self-employment. As discussed in chapter 5.5, we see the benefit and drawback 
of each matching approach. Those algorithms utilizing fewer matches, i.e. less oversampling, 
have less bias in the estimator, but high variance. Those algorithms utilizing more oversampling 
have a bias in estimators, but lower variance. There is significance for some of the algorithms, 
but there are too much disparity between them to conclude that our estimations are robust. This 
means that we cannot immediately say with confidence that the choice of becoming self-
employed is a cause for cash-out, but we will investigate this further before making any 
conclusions. 
The NN-matching without replacement (in table 6.4) show a significant ATT of 0.2350 at 5 
percent level. When we allow for replacement, we get better matches, as some control 
observations are used on multiple observations in the treatment group. This reduces the bias in 
the ATT estimator, but with a tradeoff of higher variance as fewer observations in the control 
group are used. The NN matching with one neighbor and replacement have a coefficient of 
0.3257, which is significant at the 5 percent level. When we use NN with oversampling (i.e. 
more matches per treated) we get increased bias, since there is a larger distance in propensity 
scores between the matched pairs. The benefit of oversampling is reduced variance, but in this 
case not enough to compensate for the increased downward bias in the estimator. 
There is a better tendency within the caliper-matching algorithm. Since the allowed distance 
between the propensity scores of the matches are set with a fixed caliper, we do not get as many 
bad matches, thus the estimator has less bias. This tendency increases with more constraining 
calipers, i.e. a smaller caliper. As we restrict the caliper, the ATT estimators become more 
significant and robust to oversampling, in contrast to NN-matching without a caliper. 
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Table 6.4 Estimated ATT for NN and Caliper matching 
  Nearest Neighbors 
Algorithm  1 2 5 10 
NN Matching  
without replacement 
 
0.2350 
(0.1107)** 
[0.1270]* 
   
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 208/208    
      
NN Matching 
With replacement 
 
0.3257 
(0.1537)** 
[0.1716]* 
0.2502 
(0.1282)* 
[0.1435]* 
0.1699 
(0 .1192) 
[0.1196] 
0.1499 
(0.1109) 
[0.1211] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 208/96 208/183 208/412 208/695 
      
Caliper Matching (0.01)  
0.3582 
(0.1545)** 
[0.2010]* 
0.2411 
(0.1343)* 
[0.1417]* 
0.2049 
(0.1303) 
[0.1193]* 
0.1590 
(0.1252) 
[0.1119] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 196/95 196/180 196/406 196/677 
      
Caliper Matching (0.001)  
0.3771 
(0 .1581)** 
[0 .1910]** 
0.2758 
(0 .1296)** 
[0 .1568]* 
0.2460 
(0 .1221)** 
[0 .1441]* 
0.1882 
(0 .1170) 
[0 .1349] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 170/89 170/165 170/360 170/587 
      
Caliper Matching (0.0001)  
0.3826 
(0 .1670)** 
[0 .2082]* 
0.2820 
(0 .1357)** 
[0.1806] 
0.2672 
(0.1294)** 
[0 .1296]** 
0.2164 
(0 .1233)* 
[0 .1216]* 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 161/81 161/149 161/304 161/471 
Standard error in parenthesis, bootstrapped standard error in square brackets. 
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
 
 
When we use all available matches within a caliper we get radius matching (table 6.5). In our 
case, this increases the bias of the estimators, and we no longer get significant results. The bias 
decreases with more restrictive radiuses, but not enough to offset the relatively large variance. 
As mentioned in chapter 6.3, there is a long right tail and high density in the left part of the 
propensity score distribution for the untreated in the unmatched sample. This makes the 
propensity score distribution for the untreated sensitive for oversampling in the left part of the 
distribution. Thus, when we utilize large oversampling, e.g. radius matching, the matching 
procedure does not equalize the distribution of propensity scores for treated and untreated. This 
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implies that the propensity distribution is not robust to heavy oversampling. Neither radius, 
kernel nor local linear produces any significant results. The fact that local linear matching give 
less significant estimators than kernel matching should raise some worry. We  argue that kernel 
(and radius) matching give bad matching because of the large difference in the distribution, but 
local linear should, and do, compensate for the shortcomings of kernel matching, with its use 
of a linear term in addition to the constant term25. This raises the need for further investigation 
of the propensity score distributions. 
 
Table 6.5 Estimated ATT for Radius, Kernel and Local linear matching 
  Radius 
Algorithm  0.01 0.005 0.001 0.0005 
Radius Matching  
0.1186 
(0 .1241) 
[0.1174] 
0.0771 
(0.1162) 
[0 .1201] 
0.1658 
(0.1150) 
[0.1252] 
0 .1866 
(0 .1172) 
[0 .1273] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 196/1806 184/1788 170/1375 168/1273 
  Bandwidth 
Algorithm  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Kernel matching  
0.1602 
(0.1106) 
[0.1021] 
0.1501 
(0.1039) 
[0.0980] 
0.1328 
(0. 0978) 
[0 .0925] 
0.1238 
(0.0942) 
[0.0962] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 208/1821 208/1821 208/1821 208/1821 
Local Linear  
0.1511 
(0.1537) 
[0.1165] 
0.1264 
(0.1537) 
[0.1279] 
0.1033 
(0.1537) 
[0.1059] 
0.0881 
(0.1537) 
[0.1055] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 208/1821 208/1821 208/1821 208/1821 
Standard error in parenthesis, bootstrapped standard error in square brackets. 
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
For kernel and local linear matching, Epanechnikov kernel function are used. 
 
 
In table 6.6 we show the distribution of propensity scores before and after matching, with NN-
matching without replacement and radius matching. Here we see that the unmatched 
distribution of propensity scores have significantly different properties between treated and 
untreated. In the untreated group, we see a large kurtosis, which reflects the few observations 
in the upper percentiles, while the treated have a low kurtosis and in fact almost no excess 
                                                 
25 See chapter 5.5 on matching algorithms. 
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kurtosis. By matching we want to equalize the distribution between treated and untreated, and 
we see that in the NN-matching method we get a smoother distribution difference, although not 
perfect, it is much smoother than the distribution difference in the radius matching method. 
 
Table 6.6 Distribution of propensity scores for untreated and treated 
  Unmatched Matched (NN) Matched (Radius) 
percentiles  Untreated Treated Untreated Treated Untreated Treated 
min  0.0049 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 
p(1)  0.0125 0.0218 0.0218 0.0218 0.0218 0.0218 
p(5)  0.0218 0.0363 0.0363 0.0363 0.0292 0.0363 
p(10)  0.0264 0.0436 0.0436 0.0436 0.0293 0.0426 
p(25)  0.0392 0.0666 0.0666 0.0666 0.0426 0.0612 
p(50)  0.0612 0.1447 0.1447 0.1447 0.0612 0.1075 
P(75)  0.0112 0.3212 0.2888 0.3212 0.1075 0.2034 
P(90)  0.1963 0.5697 0.3859 0.5697 0.1700 0.3212 
P(95)  0.2366 0.6418 0.4964 0.6418 0.2267 0.5428 
P(99)  0.4089 0.7327 0.6907 0.7327 0.3212 0.6907 
Max  0.8054 0.8239 0.8054 0.7924 0.7924 0.7924 
mean  0.0887 0.2271 0.1907 0.2242 0.0843 0.1512 
SD  0.0818 0.2063 0.1533 0.2026 0.0678 0.1392 
Skewness  2.9519 1.1494 1.3934 1.1387 3.3325 2.3292 
Kurtosis  16.9755 3.0728 5.1131 3.0192 24.22 9.0399 
N  1821 209 208 208 1273 168 
Distribution of propensity scores for the treated and untreated before and after 
matching. The matched distributions are NN matching without replacement, and radius 
matching with radius of 0.0005. 
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6.4.1 Trimming the propensity score distribution 
The keen observer notice that the propensity score distribution of the untreated in the unmatched 
sample in table 6.6, smooth out below the 95th percentile, reflecting the few observations with 
large distance between the propensity scores. Smith and Todd (2005) suggest setting a trimming 
level to ensure that the density are strictly positive and exceeds zero by a threshold determined 
by the trimming level. This will restrict the region of common support by dropping propensity 
scores within regions of positive but very low densities. We set a trimming level and trim away 
approximately the top 5 percentiles of the untreated propensity scores, and the top 40 percent 
of the treated are further trimmed away by common support condition. The new maximum 
propensity score after trimming is 0.2318, and we see better balancing properties than within 
the full sample, see appendix D for balancing test tables. 
Table 6.7 and 6.8 shows the result of re-estimation of ATT in trimmed sample. In these two 
tables we see an increased robustness across the different matching algorithms. The estimated 
ATT ranges between 0.2 and 0.5 indicating a substantial amount of cash-out contributed by the 
self-selection into self-employment. In chapter 7 we will give a discussion of an interesting 
possible reason for the increased robustness in the lower part of the propensity score 
distribution. Because of the previously discussed limitations in our analysis, we have to be 
careful not to over interpret our results, and in the next section we will test for unobserved 
heterogeneity in our model specification.  
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Table 6.7 Estimated ATT for NN and Caliper matching after trimming 
  Nearest Neighbors 
Algorithm  1 2 5 10 
NN Matching  
without replacement 
 
0.4258 
(0.1457)*** 
[0.1703]** 
   
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 126/126    
      
NN Matching 
With replacement 
 
0.5506 
(0.1672)*** 
[0.2313]** 
0.3748 
(0.1549)** 
[0.1804]** 
0.3228 
(0.1427)** 
[0.1566]** 
0.2995 
(0.1327)** 
[0.1463]* 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 126/66 126/131 126/315 126/559 
      
Caliper Matching (0.01)  
0.5506 
(0.1672)*** 
[0.2177]** 
0.3748 
(0.1549)** 
[0.1889]** 
0.3228 
(0.1427)** 
[0.1690]* 
0.2414 
(0.1350)* 
[0.1532] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 126/66 126/131 126/315 126/559 
      
Caliper Matching (0.001)  
0.5506 
(0.1672)*** 
[0.2338]** 
0.3875 
(0.1480)*** 
[0.1841]** 
0.3265 
(0.1429)** 
[0.1598]** 
0.2462 
(0.1367)* 
[0.1468]* 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 126/66 126/129 126/300 126/505 
      
Caliper Matching (0.0001)  
0.5448 
(0.1749)*** 
[0.2320]** 
0.3744 
(0.1539)** 
[0.1900]** 
0.3380 
(0.1502)** 
[0.1738]* 
0.2637 
(0.1429)* 
[0.1481]* 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 121/61 121/117 121/250 121/399 
Standard error in parenthesis, bootstrapped standard error in square brackets. 
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
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Table 6.8 Estimated ATT for Radius, Kernel and Local linear matching after trimming 
  Radius 
Algorithm  0.01 0.005 0.001 0.0005 
Radius Matching  
0.2136 
(0.1282)* 
[0.1306]* 
0.2062 
(0.1290) 
[0.1310] 
0.2381 
(0.1332)* 
[0.1462] 
0.2534 
(0.1350)* 
[0.1609] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 126/1677 126/1666 126/1266 126/1169 
  Bandwidth 
Algorithm  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Kernel matching  
0.2674 
(0.1272)** 
[0.1296]** 
0.2783 
(0.1272)** 
[0.1288]** 
0.2821 
(0.1271)** 
[0.1366]** 
0.2826 
(0.1271)** 
[0.1293]** 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 126/1787 126/1808 126/1812 126/1816 
Local Linear  
0.2783 
(0.1672)* 
[0.1306]** 
0.2799 
(0.1672)* 
[0.1301]** 
0.2820 
(0.1672)* 
[0 .1339]** 
0.2823 
(0.1672)* 
[0.1408]** 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 126/1787 126/1808 126/1812 126/1816 
Standard error in parenthesis, bootstrapped standard error in square brackets. 
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
For kernel and local linear matching, Epanechnikov kernel function are used. 
 
 
6.5 Sensitivity 
To test for sensitivity against unobserved heterogeneity we use the Rosenbaum bounds method 
as explained in chapter 5.8. Table 6.9 gives the results of such a test on NN matching with 
replacement and one neighbor, and a caliper matching method with one neighbor. In the 
calculation of the test statistic we use the Stata module RBOUNDS which requires the use of 
matched 1x1 pairs only (Gangl, 2004). The test in table 6.9 is for the full propensity score 
distribution, with tested bounds (Γ) from 1 up to 1.35 in steps of 0.05.  We are interested in 
sensitivity for overestimation of average treatment effect on treated, but have included a test 
for underestimation for the sake of completion.  
The least robust estimation of ATT to the presence of unobserved bias, is the NN(1). This test 
shows that the upper bound of 1 (no hidden bias) on the odds ratio of two matched individuals 
are significant and the critical level at which we would have to question the estimated positive 
effect is between 1.10 and 1.15. This means that an unobserved control variable have to alter 
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the odds ratio of treatment assignment to differ by a factor of about 1.15 between the treated 
and the untreated, in order to undermine the estimated ATT. By utilizing the caliper matching 
method, the Γ needs to be higher than 1.20 to disrupt our results in the matching analysis. This 
indicates that robustness of the ATT in respect to hidden bias is higher for caliper matching, 
because of how the caliper matching restricts the amount of bad matches. The lower bound at 
1 is also significant, and with higher Γ the significance level increases, which is expected since 
we have estimated a positive treatment effect. 
The test indicates that we have some sensitivity to hidden bias since the bounds are fairly low, 
and thus we may have overestimated the treatment effect. The sensitivity to hidden bias comes 
as no surprise as we have discussed the limitations of the available data, but we still think we 
have indicated a possible causal connection between self-selection into self-employment and 
cash-out refinancing that would be of interest for further investigation. 
 
Table 6.9 Sensitivity test of unobserved heterogeneity 
  NN(1)  NN(1), Caliper (0.0001) 
Γ  𝑝+ 𝑝− 
 
𝑝+ 𝑝− 
1.00  0.0062 0.0062 
 
0.0030 0.0030 
1.05  0.0140 0.0025 
 
0.0066 0.0013 
1.10  0.0282 0.0009 
 
0.0131 0.0005 
1.15  0.0513 0.0003 
 
0.0239 0.0005 
1.20  0.0854 0.0000 
 
0.0401 0.0002 
1.25  0.1318 0.0000 
 
0.0631 0.0000 
1.30  0.1903 0.0000 
 
0.0938 0.0000 
1.35  0.2594 0.0000 
 
0.1323 0.0000 
Γ : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors  
𝑝+ : upper bound significance level 
𝑝− : lower bound significance level 
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Table 6.10 gives the same sensitivity analysis as above, but now on the ATT from the trimmed 
propensity score distribution. In comparison to the untrimmed propensity score distribution, we 
now see a higher significant bound. For the NN(1) algorithm the bound is now between 1.45 
and 1.5, and for the caliper algorithm the bound is between 1.4 and 1.45. This shows that when 
we have trimmed away the lower densities of the propensity score distribution, we have a more 
robust result in respect to unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
Table 6.10 Sensitivity test of unobserved heterogeneity after trimming 
  NN(1)  NN(1), Caliper (0.0001) 
Γ  𝑝+ 𝑝− 
 
𝑝+ 𝑝− 
1.00  0.0003 0.0003 
 
0.0004 0.0004 
1.05  0.0007 0.0001 
 
0.0009 0.0001 
1.10  0.0015 0.0000 
 
0.0020 0.0000 
1.15  0.0029 0.0000 
 
0.0038 0.0000 
1.20  0.0053 0.0000 
 
0.0068 0.0000 
1.25  0.0091 0.0000 
 
0.0113 0.0000 
1.30  0.0148 0.0000 
 
0.0179 0.0000 
1.35  0.0228 0.0000 
 
0.0271 0.0000 
1.40  0.0336 0.0000 
 
0.0393 0.0000 
1.45  0.0478 0.0000 
 
0.0549 0.0000 
1.50  0.0656 0.0000 
 
0.0742 0.0000 
Γ : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors  
𝑝+ : upper bound significance level 
𝑝− : lower bound significance level 
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6.6 The size of cash-out caused by the self-employed 
Su et al. (2014) roughly quantifies the size of the cash-out26 to be 36% of the current mortgage, 
which is a significant part of the total current mortgage of the Norwegian households. We have 
studied the cash-out behavior for those who become self-employed, and we find that their total 
cash-out within our sample sum up to about 163 million. By relating this to the total cash-out 
in our sample of about 1509 million27, the cash out contributed by the self-employed constitutes 
about 11% which is a substantial amount contributed by a small part of the labor force. The 
total current mortgage of the Norwegian households in our sample is about 4025 million which 
in fact makes the cash-out of the self-employed about 4% of the total current mortgage. 
When we look at the ATT estimates of cash-out, we find to what extent the cash-out of the self-
employed is caused by the self-selection into self-employment. Even though the estimated ATT 
differs for the different algorithms, they seems to circle around 0.3, and since cash-out in itself 
is a rough estimate the ATT will be rough estimates too. By taking size of the ATT in 
comparison to the total cash-out we find that the ATT on cash-out constitutes about 5% of total 
cash-out. This is lower than total percentage of cash-out from the self-employed, and reflects 
the amount of cash-out that are used to fund the start-up of businesses, thus the causal effect on 
cash-out behavior of becoming self-employed. 
 
 
                                                 
26 Setting negative cash-out estimates to zero when computing the sum of the lower bounds. 
27 Note that these levels are a little lower than what found by Su et al. (2014) since we have restricted our sample 
further. 
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7 Further Discussions 
7.1 Gender Difference 
In the last chapter we found that the average treatment effect on treated were much more 
significant and robust across the different matching algorithms in the lower part of the 
propensity score distribution (when we trimmed the propensity scores). We have made a 
calculated guess that this could be caused by the gender difference of the self-employed as 
previously discussed, where women have a lower propensity to become self-employed than 
men. Hence, we want to further see if there is some difference in the average treatment effect 
on treated between men and women in an informal analysis. The estimated propensity scores 
come from the logit model for each gender, see table 6.1 in chapter 6.1.  
In appendix A we have given summary statistics for the self-employed and each gender 
separately (table A.1). We find that the mean cash-out of men who are self-employed (0.51 
million) are at a similar level as the mean cash-out of the wage-employed (0.52 million, from 
table 4.2 in chapter 4.2). However, women have a much larger mean cash-out in comparison, 
at a level as high as 0.81 million. There are some mean age difference, but the only visually 
considerable mean difference between the genders of the self-employed are the level of cash-
out. 
In appendix B we have given ATT tables for women and men separately. In these tables there 
is a striking difference between the genders. For the male self-employed individual we cannot 
see any significant ATT (table B.1 and B.2). This means that in our sample, and with our 
matching criteria, the male participants do not have a causal connection between self-
employment and cash-out refinancing. However, the female participants seems to have much 
more significant and positive ATT values, and more robust results over the different algorithms 
(table B.3 and B.4). This means that the act of becoming self-employed for women seems to be 
a cause of cash-out refinancing. This gives an indication of different behavior or opportunities 
for the female self-employed. As noted by Rønsen (2012), an explanation could be that female 
entrepreneurs attract less capital in the start-up phase28, thus maybe home equity could be a 
more inviting solution to raise start-up capital for women than for men. Another possible 
explanation could be attributed to psychological factors like risk aversion (see e.g. Ekelund et 
al. (2005), Brown et al. (2011)) and how women in general are more risk averse than men. One 
could justify such claims by how home-equity may feel like a safer place to look for funding 
                                                 
28 See background literature, chapter 2.1.1 
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than more conventional sources. At this point the gender difference in ATT are mere calculated 
speculation, and first and foremost a resource for further investigation as this can have some 
implications for policy decisions. 
 
7.2 Policy implications 
Su et al. (2014) discusses policy implications in regard to the high cash-out contributed debt 
levels, and suggests that the cash-out to income ratio may be more informative than the 
mortgage to income ratio, hence housing policies should pay more attention to regulating home 
equity based refinancing. With the discussion in chapter 7.1 and chapter 6.6 in mind, such 
regulations may have adverse effects on women’s opportunity to become self-employed. 
Rønsen (2012) suggest that a higher women to men ratio among the self-employed may be 
beneficial to economic growth and job creation, thus a policy regulation should not limit the 
available liquidity for women, who more than men seems to rely on cash-out as a financing 
option of start-ups. A solution could be complimentary governmental support to female 
entrepreneurs, which may decrease the amount of cash-out from self-employed women. 
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8 Conclusion 
In our analysis, we have raised an interesting question about a causal relationship between the 
self-selection into self-employment and the level of cash-out refinancing. The sample data show 
that self-employed individuals have about 0.1 million larger mean cash-out than the wage-
employed. Using propensity score matching we address the issues of self-selection bias caused 
by non-random differences between the self-employed and the wage-employed. The matching 
results indicates that the average amount of cash-out caused by self-selection into self-
employment (“average treatment effect on the treated”) differs between 0.1 and 0.3 million 
among the different matching algorithms. The significance level of the estimates is sensitive to 
different matching algorithms, which indicates that the results are not robust. We have 
overcome data limitations with some empirically sound assumptions regarding control 
variables. However, this leaves room for some bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity, which 
we have tested for with a sensitivity analysis, indicating that we should use some caution when 
interpreting the estimated average treatment effect. 
Next, we investigate a trimmed sample where we cut away the lower densities of the propensity 
score distribution. Within this trimmed sample we get robust results with estimated average 
treatment effect on the treated ranging from 0.2 to 0.5 million in cash-out. An advantage with 
this result is a decreased sensitivity for unobserved heterogeneity compared to the untrimmed 
sample. Further, we informally hypothesize that the increased average treatment effect in the 
trimmed sample is caused by a gender difference. We investigate the mean cash-out of men and 
women in the full sample, which shows that women have a substantial larger mean cash-out 
than men. By matching in the subsample of men and women, we find no significant average 
treatment effect on treated for men, but for women there are significant and robust average 
treatment effect on treated between 0.4 and 0.6 million.  
We conclude that our data indicate a causal relationship between selection into self-employment 
and cash-out, especially for women. The size of the cash-out caused by the self-selection into 
self-employment are roughly estimated to be about 5% of the total cash-out, which is a sizeable 
amount of the total cash-out. Thus, our thesis have explained some of the ambiguity around the 
cash-out behavior, in that we have found a causal relationship quantified as a measureable 
amount of total cash-out. But, due to our data limitations we urge for more research on this 
causal relationship to explain some of the effects from cash-out, which Su et al. (2014) links to 
the recent surge in the Norwegian household’s debt levels. 
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Appendix A:  Summary statistics men and women  
 
Table A.1 Summary statistics of gender difference between the self-employed 
 
 Men 
N=162 
 
Women 
N=81 
Variable 
 
Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD 
Cash-Out 
 
0.51 0.37 1.01  0.81 0.52 1.63 
Age 
 
47.86 48.00 11.22  45.77 46.00 10.36 
Education 
 
0.77 0.50 0.85  0.84 1.00 0.89 
Couple 
 
0.88 1.00 0.32  0.89 1.00 0.32 
Partner Education 
 
0.23 0.00 0.42  0.23 0.00 0.43 
Number of employed 
persons in household 
 
1.67 2.00 0.69  1.54 2.00 0.67 
Note: the number of observations for cash-out is 133 for men and 76 for women. 
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Appendix B: ATT gender difference tables 
 
 
Table B.1: Estimated ATT for NN and Caliper matching for men 
  Nearest Neighbors 
Algorithm  1 2 5 10 
NN Matching  
without replacement 
 
0.1658 
(0.1111) 
[0 .1392] 
   
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 133/133    
      
NN Matching 
With replacement 
 
0.2490 
(0 .1454)* 
[0.2202] 
0.0894 
(0.1231) 
[0 .1665] 
0 .0794 
(0.1300) 
[0.1387] 
0 .0620 
(0 .1211) 
[0 .1206] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 133/59 133/109 133/239 133/380 
      
Caliper Matching (0.01)  
0 .2276 
(0 .1488) 
[0.2401] 
0 .0690 
(0 .1272) 
[0 .1667] 
0 .0619 
(0 .1374) 
[0 .1533] 
0 .0289 
(0 .1322) 
[0.1349] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 121/57 121/104 121/231 121/368 
      
Caliper Matching (0.001)  
0.2215 
(0 .1501) 
[0.2841] 
0.0897 
(0.1336) 
[0 .1931] 
0.0538 
(0 .1543) 
[0 .1542] 
0 .0190 
(0 .1486) 
[0.1355] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 114/52 114/96 114/216 114/333 
      
Caliper Matching (0.0001)  
0.2952 
(0 .1543)* 
[0 .2690] 
0.1785 
(0 .1316) 
[0.2173] 
0 .1214 
(0 .1399) 
[0 .1528] 
0 .0802 
(0.1323) 
[0 .1470] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 102/49 102/88 102/188 102/284 
Standard error in parenthesis, bootstrapped standard error in square brackets. 
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
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Table B.2 Estimated ATT for Radius, Kernel and Local linear matching for men 
  Radius 
Algorithm  0.01 0.005 0.001 0.0005 
Radius Matching  
-0.0652 
(0 .1295) 
[0 .1230] 
-0.0649 
(0 .1443) 
[0 .1256] 
-0.0732 
(0 .1491) 
[0 .1352] 
-0.0519 
(0 .1518) 
[0 .1558] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 121/945 117/911 114/803 112/785 
  Bandwidth 
Algorithm  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Kernel matching  
-0.0351 
(0.1241) 
[0.1171] 
-0.0139 
(0.1161) 
[0.1075] 
-0.0153 
(0.1092) 
[0.1072] 
-0.0135 
(0.1032) 
[0.1078] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 133/987 133/987 133/987 133/987 
Local Linear  
-0.0257 
(0.1454) 
[0.1244] 
-0.0372 
(0.1454) 
[0.0940] 
-0.0488 
(0.1454) 
[0.1431] 
-0.0753 
(0.1454) 
[0.1240] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 133/987 133/987 133/987 133/987 
Standard error in parenthesis, bootstrapped standard error in square brackets. 
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
For kernel and local linear matching, Epanechnikov kernel function are used. 
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Table B.3 Estimated ATT for NN and Caliper for women 
  Nearest Neighbors 
Algorithm  1 2 5 10 
NN Matching  
without replacement 
 
0 .3992 
(0 .2409)* 
[0 .2352]* 
   
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 73/73    
      
NN Matching 
With replacement 
 
0.5095 
(0.3480) 
[0.2989]* 
0.3598 
(0.2639) 
[0.2672] 
0.4516 
(0.2270)** 
[0.2320]* 
0.3196 
(0.2126) 
[0.2389] 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 76/39 73/72 73/162 73/289 
      
Caliper Matching (0.01)  
0.5507 
(0.3311)* 
[0.3050]* 
0.5443 
(0.2673)** 
[0.2454]** 
0.6168 
(0.2437)** 
[0.2299]*** 
0.5154 
(0.2329)** 
[0.2359]** 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 64/35 64/68 64/148 64/268 
      
Caliper Matching (0.001)  
0.5730 
(0.3425)* 
[0.2955]* 
0.5162 
(0.2756)* 
[0.2811]* 
0.5521 
(0.2500)** 
[0.2678]** 
0.4734 
(0.2397)** 
[0.2219]** 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 60/33 60/64 60/134 60/209 
      
Caliper Matching (0.0001)  
0.5250 
(0.3526) 
[0.3118]* 
0.4556 
(0.2838) 
[0.2823] 
0.5193 
(0.2540)** 
[0.2791]* 
0.4228 
(0.2427)* 
[0.2534]* 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 57/31 57/58 57/117 57/183 
Standard error in parenthesis, bootstrapped standard error in square brackets. 
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
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Table B.4 Estimated ATT for Radius, Kernel and Local linear matching for women 
  Radius 
Algorithm  0.01 0.005 0.001 0.0005 
Radius Matching  
0.5396 
(0.2260)** 
[0 .2472]** 
0.5193 
(0.2266)** 
[0 .2434]** 
0.5144 
(0.2380)** 
[0 .2367]** 
0 .4720 
(0.2360)** 
[0 .2555]* 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 64/807 62/732 60/522 58/493 
  Bandwidth 
Algorithm  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Kernel matching  
0.4299 
(0.2061)** 
[0.2054]** 
0.4053 
(0.1993)** 
[0.2051]** 
0.3980 
(0.1958)** 
[0.1991]** 
0.3845 
(0.1948)** 
[0.2054]* 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 73/834 73/834 73/834 73/834 
Local Linear  
0.4546 
(0.3480) 
[0.1988]** 
0.4294 
(0.3480) 
[0.2501]* 
0.4057 
(0.3480) 
[0.2097]* 
0.4017 
(0.3480) 
[0.2092]* 
Observations 
Treated/Untreated 
 73/834 73/834 73/834 73/834 
Standard error in parenthesis, bootstrapped standard error in square brackets. 
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
For kernel and local linear matching, Epanechnikov kernel function are used. 
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Appendix C: Winsorize  
There are several options in dealing with outliers. The first alternative is to ignore the problem, 
but this can heavily affect the distribution and give biased estimators. Another variant is to trim 
the data, where you clip of some percentile of the top and/or bottom of the distribution. This 
may be effective but does in a way censor data, by removing some of the distribution. An 
alternative to trimming the data is to winsorize it, where you do not remove or censor any data 
but instead do a transformation of the extreme values over some percentile. 
When winsorizing, the data is ordered (not including missing data) in such a way that 
observations (𝑥):  
𝑥1  <= . . . <=  𝑥𝑛 
Then new variables (𝑦) are created which are identical to 𝑥 except that the lower and/or higher 
ℎ variables are replaced by the next value counting inward from the extremes: 
𝑦1, . . . , 𝑦ℎ  =  𝑦ℎ + 1 
𝑦𝑛, . . . , 𝑦𝑛 − ℎ + 1  =  𝑦𝑛 − ℎ 
The specification of ℎ can either be a percentile or any specified number of variables counting 
from the extremes. 
In figure C.1 we see the result of winsorizing the cash-out variable, accomplished by using the 
Stata module WINSOR (Cox, 2006). Before winsorizing there are long thin tails in the 
distribution, which is transformed after winsorizing. 
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Figure C.1 Distribution of cash-out before and after winsorizing at 1st and 99th percentile 
Note: different scale on x-axis 
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Appendix D: Matching quality trimmed sample 
 
Table D.1 Bias reduction in the control variables within trimmed sample 
  
 U
n
m
at
ch
ed
 
 M
at
ch
ed
 
Mean   
 %
R
ed
u
ce
d
 
 B
ia
s 
t-test 
Variable  Treated Untreated  %Bias t P > |t| 
Age  U 5.7703 5.1697  28.4  3.88 0.000 
  M 5.8095 5.6508  7.5 73.6 0.61 0.543 
          
AgeSquared  U 37.722 31.233  26.6  3.77 0.000 
  M 38.127 36.032  8.6 67.7 0.69 0.491 
          
Gender  U 0.6363 0.5420  19.2  2.60 0.009 
  M 0.5714 0.5793  -1.6 91.6 -0.13 0.899 
          
Education  U 0.7799 1.3185  -67.1  -9.66 0.000 
  M 1.1270 1.1032  3.0 95.6 0.23 0.815 
          
Couple  U 0.8899 0.8286  17.7  2.26 0.024 
  M 0.8412 0.8571  -4.6 74.1 -0.35 0.726 
          
PartnerEducation  U 0.2248 0.0335  59.4  12.08 0.000 
  M 0 0  0.0 100.0 . . 
          
NumEmployed  U 1.6746 1.7814  -16.8  -2.37 0.018 
  M 1.7460 1.7937  -7.5 55.4 -0.67 0.506 
The table presents mean values of treated and untreated before and after matching for each 
control variable. %Bias is the standardized bias, and %Reduced Bias is the reduction in 
standardized bias after matching. t values are reported from test for difference in means of 
treated and untreated. 
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Table D.2 Difference between unmatched and matched within trimmed sample 
Sample  
Pseudo R 
Squared 
Likelihood 
Ratio chi2 
P > chi2 
Mean 
Bias 
Median 
Bias 
Rubin’s 
B 
Rubin’s 
R 
Unmatched  0.142 191.10 0.000 33.6 26.6 96.5 2.29 
Matched  0.003 0.93 0.988 4.7 4.6 12.1* 1.69* 
The table presents the difference of Pseudo R squared, mean bias, median bias and Rubin’s R 
and B for unmatched and matched sample. 
* if B < 25%, R in [0.5, 2] 
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Appendix E: Test of multicollinarity 
We test for multicollinarity by utilizing the Stata module COLLIN (Ender, 2010), which reports 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) for every control variable. VIF is determined by the 
correlation of 𝑥𝑖 and the other explanatory variables. 
𝑉𝐼𝐹𝑖 =
1
(1 − 𝑅𝑖
2)
 
Where 𝑅𝑖
2 is the R-squared from regressing 𝑥𝑖 on all other explanatory variables including a 
constant term (Woolridge, 2012). The VIF’s for the variables included in our logit-model, is 
presented in table E.1. Inclusion of the squared age variable, gives multicollinarity because of 
how squared terms are likely to be correlated with its root. Such cases of multicollinarity are of 
no harm since they have minimal effect on the p-values. By excluding AgeSquared we get VIF 
values below 10 for all control variables. We conclude that there is no sign of strong 
multicollinarity in our logit model. 
 
Table E.1 Variance Inflation Factor 
 
 
Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable 
 Inclusion of Age 
squared 
 
Exclusion of Age 
squared 
AgeSquared 
 
17.63  - 
Age 
 
17.44  1.01 
Gender 
 
1.01  1.01 
Education 
 
1.03  1.02 
Couple 
 
1.26  1.26 
PartnerEducation 
 
1.04  1.03 
NumEmployed 
 
1.29  1.25 
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Appendix F: Matching estimators  
This appendix serves as an extension of chapter 5.5, where we give a brief mathematical 
representation of matching estimators as given by Smith and Todd (2005). The ATT matching 
estimator have the following form: 
 
?̂?𝐴𝑇𝑇
𝑃𝑆𝑀 =
1
𝑁1
∑ (𝑌1𝑖 − ∑ 𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑌0𝑗 
𝑗∈𝐼0
)
𝑖∈𝐼1∩𝑆𝑃
 (F.1) 
𝑆𝑃 defines the region of common support, 𝐼1 and 𝐼0 are the set of treated and untreated 
respectfully and 𝑁1 is the number of observations in set 𝐼1 ∩ 𝑆𝑃. 𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗) is a weighting function 
dependent on the distance between the treated propensity score (𝑃𝑖), and the untreated 
propensity score (𝑃𝑗). The variance of the ATT estimator, as estimated by PSMATCH2, is given 
by: 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝐴𝑇𝑇
𝑃𝑆𝑀) =
1
𝑁1
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌1|𝐷 = 1) +
1
𝑁1
2 ∑ 𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗)
2
𝑗∈𝐼0
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌0|𝐷 = 0) (F.2)  
 
𝐶(𝑃𝑖) defines a propensity score neighborhood around each treated with neighbors form the 
untreated propensity score sample. Individuals 𝑗 matched to treated individual 𝑖 are those 
individuals in set 𝐴𝑖 = {𝑗 ∈ 𝐼0|𝑃𝑗 ∈ 𝐶(𝑃𝑖)}. NN matching defines 𝐶(𝑃𝑖) = min
𝑖
‖𝑃𝑖 − 𝑃𝑗‖ , 𝑗 ∈
𝐼0, and caliper matching defines 𝐶(𝑃𝑖) = {𝑃𝑗  | ‖𝑃𝑖 − 𝑃𝑗‖ < 𝜖}, where 𝜖 is the restricting caliper. 
Oversampling in these algorithms in our thesis is done with uniform weighting. 
Kernel and local linear defines 𝐶(𝑃𝑖) =  {|
𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑗
𝑎𝑛
| ≤ 1} , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐼0, where 𝑎𝑛 is a bandwidth 
parameter. The weight in kernel matching is given by: 
 
𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝐾 (
𝑃𝑗 − 𝑃𝑖
𝑎𝑛
)
∑ 𝐾 (
𝑃𝑘 − 𝑃𝑖
𝑎𝑛
)𝑘∈𝐼0
 (F.3) 
Where K is a kernel function (Epanechnikov kernel in our thesis) with the form 𝐾(𝑥) =
3
4
(1 − 𝑥2)𝟏|𝑥|≤1, where 𝟏|𝑥|≤1 is an indicator function restricting the function values to only 
non-negative outcomes. The counterfactual outcome for kernel matching, can be viewed as the 
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solution to the ?̂? estimator from the weighted regression on an intercept:  
min
𝛼
∑ (𝑌0𝑗 − 𝛼)
2
𝐾 (
𝑃𝑗−𝑃𝑖
𝑎𝑛
)𝑗∈𝐼0 . 
 In local linear the weight is given by: 
 
𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝐾𝑖𝑗 ∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑘(𝑃𝑘 − 𝑃𝑖)
2 − [𝐾𝑖𝑗(𝑃𝑗 − 𝑃𝑖)][∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑗(𝑃𝑘 − 𝑃𝑖)]𝑘∈𝐼0𝑘∈𝐼0
∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑗 ∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑘(𝑃𝑘 − 𝑃𝑖)2 − (∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑘(𝑃𝑘 − 𝑃𝑖))𝑘∈𝐼0
2
𝑘∈𝐼0𝑗∈𝐼0
 (F.4) 
Where 𝐾𝑖𝑗 = 𝐾((𝑃𝑗 − 𝑃𝑖)/𝑎𝑛)). Fan (1993) shows that the local linear estimator for the 
counterfactual outcome can be viewed as the solution to the ?̂? estimator from the weighted 
regression with an intercept and a slope: min
𝛼,𝛽
∑ (𝑌0𝑗 − 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑃𝑗 − 𝑃𝑖))
2
𝐾 (
𝑃𝑗−𝑃𝑖
𝑎𝑛
)𝑗∈𝐼0 . 
